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In 2005, Dr. William Cooper, then the President of the University of Richmond, decided to 
increase the institution’s tuition price by a staggering 31 percent. Given the general societal 
opposition to tuition increases in higher education, questions are raised as to why and how Dr. 
Cooper made such a bold decision, and whether this was an instance of good leadership. The 
answer to “why?” lies in the unique intricacies of the economics of higher education, where 
unlike traditional microeconomic theory, the competitive market produces higher prices overall, 
and increases to a university’s overall wealth can lead to enhanced educational quality and 
increased institutional access and affordability. The answer to “how?” rests in the narrative of 
Dr. Cooper’s decision-marking process, a story of careful, deliberate and expert navigation 
through the university’s governance structure.  The appraisal of whether this was an exhibition of 
“good leadership” involves an evaluation of both leadership effectiveness and leadership ethics. 
Generally speaking, per the criteria of G. Donald Chandler and John Chandler’s theory of 
leadership effectiveness as well as many other theories of effective leadership, Dr. Cooper did 
display effective leadership through this decision. Also, since the decision led to both a definitive 
betterment of the university and to a potential betterment of society, Dr. Cooper demonstrated 
ethical leadership in his decision. Ultimately, Dr. Cooper’s bold decision in 2005 was an 
example of “good leadership.”
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“Skyrocketing,” a word frequently and hyperbolically used by columnists in the present 
age, is the verb du jour when describing the increasing price of college tuition in America over 
the past thirty years.  The media does not seem to be exaggerating in this case, though. The cost 
of attending a collegiate institution, in the year 2013, has increased by 631 percent since the year 
1978, two and a half times the national rate of inflation.1 In essence, the increase of price of a 
degree is well over twice the increase in the price of groceries during the same timeframe. Thus, 
higher education is seemingly becoming more expensive and unattainable for Americans, a cause 
of great concern within the nation’s political and economic discourse. In light of this trend, 
Americans yearn for more access and affordability in the academic realm. Recently, in February 
of 2013, President Obama claimed, “We can’t allow higher education to be a luxury in this 
country. It’s an economic imperative that every family in America has to be able to afford.”2 In 
an era when the nation longs for more affordability and scrutinizes institutions that implement 
great price hikes, one would think it might even be beneficial to offer a lower price to 
prospective students. At the least, it would seem counter-intuitive that any university ought to 
raise its sticker-price by any amount greater than the national inflation rate.  
 However, in 2004-05, Dr. William Cooper, then the president of the University of 
Richmond, did exactly that.  Beginning in the fall semester of 2004, the university increased its 
price of attendance by 27 percent and its price of tuition by 31 percent, ultimately increasing the 
sticker-price by $7,000 per student. The action was essentially unprecedented by a small, liberal 
arts college like Richmond, or, for that matter, any postsecondary institution. What’s more, the 
university had previously positioned itself in the marketplace as a school which provided value 





most definitely a daring act of leadership. Cooper was lauded by some for his resolve towards his 
vision for the university and vilified by others for making an already affluent university more 
expensive and supposedly less accessible for prospective students. Considering the pressure put 
upon universities to control their costs of attendance, it begs one to question how Cooper could 
justify such an increase. Why did Richmond, an already flourishing and well-endowed 
institution, need more tuition revenue? Why move away from the university’s former mission of 
offering value to its students? Most importantly, how could Cooper’s decision ever be 
determined an act of “good” leadership, considering both leadership effectiveness and ethics? 
 In this paper, I will address the questions above. I will first present the contextual 
elements most relevant to Dr. William Cooper’s leadership decision in 2004-05. In chapter one, I 
will describe the nation’s broad, socioeconomic landscape relating to education. Next, I will 
explain the unique intricacies of the economics of higher education, in contrast with traditional 
microeconomic theory. Afterward, I will delve further into matters specific to the University of 
Richmond within the marketplace for postsecondary education, including the school’s market 
position, its competitor schools and the ranking systems used to evaluate college quality. In 
chapter two, I will present the narrative of Dr. Cooper’s decision itself, in light of chapter one’s 
contextual elements. Finally, in chapter three, I will discuss an evaluation of the decision, using 
theories of leadership effectiveness and leadership ethics, reinforced by an understanding of the 
economics of higher education. I will consider each contextual level of the decision, from the 
university at-large to society as a whole, in my evaluation. Ultimately, I will come to a 
conclusion whether Dr. William Cooper’s decision to raise the sticker-price of Richmond by 27 






Chapter One: Context of the Case Study 
I. Broad Context of Dr. Cooper’s Decision: 
 In order to fully understand and evaluate the tuition-pricing decision made by former 
University of Richmond president William Cooper, one must have an idea of the macroeconomic 
trends and socioeconomic positions of the nation in the years prior to and following 2004-05. In 
this section, I will examine the economic climate from the 1990 until 2013 as well as national 
concerns about sticker-price and student debt. I will then briefly discuss financial aid, and 
afterward, identify the government’s role in higher education. Additionally, I will describe 
society’s viewpoint on higher education aside from economics. Finally, I will provide a 
discussion of the future of higher education, considering both 2004 and 2013. 
A. Nation’s Economic Climate: 1990-2013 
In the 1990’s, the United States experienced substantial economic growth. The growth 
rate of real GDP commonly remained above 4% per year.3 The nation’s overall productivity 
accelerated, especially due to extensive technological advances in the economy.4 Rapid growth 
continued through the end of the 1990s. The unemployment rate fell below five percent in 1997 
while inflation rates remained manageably low.5 The late 1990’s economic expansion became 
the longest expansion in the United States’ economy on record.6 The stock market was soaring 
until 2000, with rapid price increases in the stock prices and valuations of technology 
corporations. However, by 2000-01, it was evident that the rapid price increases in the dot-com 
sector were unsustainable. Many of the large internet business ventures, forecasted to be 





at only one-third of a percent and unemployment reached its highest rate in four years.7 The past 
decade of growth came to a serious and abrupt halt at the beginning of the 2000’s. 
The economic build-up to 2000-01 is also known as the Dot-Com Bubble. A bubble 
emerges within a specific sector of the economy when prices seem to be based upon implausible 
views of future asset values, profitability, or return on investment.8 In the Dot-Com Bubble, 
growing internet start-ups, forecasted to have much financial promise, were just not worth the 
billions of dollars at which they were initially valued. When the values of the companies were 
finally realized, the market receded greatly. The effects of the Dot-Com Bubble were short-lived, 
though. The economy rebounded in the years leading up to Cooper’s decision, moving from 
annual growth rates in real GDP near zero in 2001 to rates above four percent in 2004.9 Median 
household income levels were relatively level10 and unemployment was beginning to decline 
again.11 In fact, in 2004, Alan Greenspan, the former head of the Federal Reserve, was quoted 
saying that the United States was “doing just fine” and “…entered 2005 expanding at a 
reasonably good pace, with inflation and inflationary expectations reasonably well anchored.”12 
In short, the overall economic climate in 2004 was favorable, an important notion to keep in 
mind when evaluating Cooper’s price hike. Making a similar decision in 2000 in a more unstable 
climate may have proven much more difficult.  
Part of the reason for the rapid, economic growth experienced in the early to mid-2000’s 
was the boom in the United States housing market. Housing prices were soaring nationwide and 
most people assumed that mortgaging or refinancing a home was a safe and sound investment, 
due to the rate by which housing prices were increasing. At the same time, many banks granted 





Additionally, big banks purchased the aggregate debt from smaller banks and repackaged it 
through various complex, financial instruments, making huge profits.  The nature of these 
financial instruments now connected the nation’s local housing markets which were formerly 
independent of one another. Housing prices in one portion of the nation, say Boston, now 
affected prices in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Defaulting anywhere now had severe, nationwide 
ramifications. Once housing prices stopped increasing at their unsustainable rates, people began 
to default on their mortgages at an alarming rate, drying up much of the funds in banks 
everywhere, not just in local markets. When banks had no money, they could no longer issue 
loans to any commercial entities or private citizens, causing a huge freeze which stifled the entire 
economy – the banking crisis of 2008. After the recession which followed the banking crisis, the 
nation’s economic performance looked bleak, consumer confidence was extremely low and 
many individuals’ median incomes and net worth were negatively affected.13 As a result, it is 
hard to imagine a college president making a decision like Cooper’s in the post-2008 economic 
climate either.  
The Great Recession of the late 2000’s obviously was not a consideration in Cooper’s 
decision, nor could it reasonably have been. It would be rash at this point in the paper to hold 
Cooper immediately accountable for the university’s well-being during an event widely regarded 
as unforeseeable, unless the decision solely was made because of a prediction of an impending 
crisis, which is not the case here. But, assigning responsibility to an individual is one matter; 
objectively analyzing the cause and effects of a complex situation is another. Taking note of the 
recession’s effects on higher education’s future role in society and the University of Richmond’s 
future within higher education, it will be necessary to note if Cooper did or did not make the 





B. National Concern about the Price of College  
 All things considered, the negative consequences of speculative bubbles in the American 
economy’s recent history make economists, politicians and the general public very anxious about 
certain sectors which exhibit rapidly increasing prices. During the housing bubble, people 
assumed that they could purchase a house at a certain price and then resell it in the future for a 
guaranteed profit. Similarly, most people invest in a college education under the impression they 
will receive a substantial return due to potential, future earnings. Yet, if the value of the 
education does not align with the price that the student pays, possibly because the rising tuition 
prices may lead to egregiously burdensome debt, then the higher education market would suffer 
once the alternatives to attending college become more profitable endeavors.  Historically, there 
is no real debate whether a college education leads to greater earnings; the returns on a college 
education are definitively proven. For instance, “the median weekly earnings for a full-time, full-
year bachelor’s degree holder in 2011 was 64 percent higher than those for a high school 
graduate.”14 Also, the unemployment rate for bachelor’s degree-holding individuals is 4.9 
percent, compared to 9.4 percent for individuals with only their high school diploma.15 It is clear 
that graduating college, compared to the alternatives, is more often than not the more lucrative 
route. 
There is much contention, though, about the existence of a higher education bubble and 
the diminishing returns from a college diploma. Many prominent academics, economists and 
entrepreneurs take stances on either side of the debate. For instance, Peter Thiel, the founder of 
PayPal and renowned predictor of both the Dot-Com and housing bubbles, argues for the 
parallels between housing and education by claiming, “…the education bubble is about security 





Americans: Do this and you will be safe…Housing prices would always go up, and you will 
always make more money if you are college educated.”16 On the other hand, experts also assert 
the contrary, that the returns to a college education still do support the cost of investment. Philip 
Oreopoulos and Uros Petronijevic, in their article “Making College Worth It: A Review of the 
Returns to Higher Education” cite several analyses in support of the average investment in a 
college education in relation to its cost. One analysis reads: 
“When Avery and Turner analyzed total accumulated student debt six years after college 
enrollment from 2004 to 2009, they found that the median accumulated debt among 
students at public four-year institutions was $6,000. Among those who completed a 
bachelor’s degree, the median was $7,500; the 90th percentile was $32,000. Less than 
half of a percent of graduating students…had more than $100,000 of student debt… The 
authors concluded that the popular media claim that levels of student borrowing are 
universally too high is simply not accurate”17 
Therefore, even though similarities certainly exist between the characteristics of the housing 
bubble and the current trends in the higher education market, expert analysis seems to settle the 
debate over the returns of an investment in postsecondary education at this point in time. At any 
rate, the most important takeaway from the aforementioned debate is the augmented anxiety 
citizens and experts possess concerning the increasing cost of higher education. Focusing on 
Richmond’s role in the overall national trend of increasing sticker-prices is also integral to the 
discussion. If Cooper was to justify his decision economically, he had to ensure his institution 
delivered long-term value to its students equal to or greater than the cost of attendance. The 
congruence or incongruence between the price and value of a postsecondary education will be a 





C. National Concern about Student Debt 
Furthermore, mass accumulation of debt by the public is also a great concern of the 
American people. People take on large amounts of debt to pay for their college education, under 
the assumption that, in the long-run, their investment will pay off.  Whereas the Avery and 
Turner study, presented in the previous section, shows debt levels currently are not troublesome 
in relation to return on investment, there are many notable statistics regarding rising levels in 
student debt, which show a potential future decrease in return on investment or even individuals 
turning away from pursuing a postsecondary education altogether. Initially, 12 million of the 20 
million students who attend college annually borrow money in some amount.18 In 2004, total 
national student debt was roughly below $350 billion.19 Since 2004, student loan debt has nearly 
tripled, totaling to around one trillion in 2012.20 As a result, one can see that over the same 
timeframe when college tuition price increases greatly, debt levels too increase greatly since 
students finance more of their education by borrowing.  
 Debt in and of itself is not necessarily troubling. Not being able to pay that debt is, 
however, and delinquency rates are rising as well. In 1999, only $90 billion in student loans were 
outstanding; in 2011 that same balance had expanded to $550 billion.21 What’s more, between 
2004 and 2009, 41 percent of federal student loan borrowers faced negative consequences of 
delinquency or default.22 Higher education, economically speaking, is supposed to enhance a 
nation's growth by enhancing society’s aggregate human capital and earning potential. However, 
when individuals’ debt burdens amass to such a high level, college graduates may not be able to 
spend and invest in the national economy to even achieve that intended growth. Though Avery 
and Turner claim that returns to higher education are currently still increasing, the duration of 





Relating these trends in student debt to the case at hand, one must evaluate how the increase in 
tuition at Richmond affected its prospective students’ means of financing their education. Did the 
price hike increase the amount of loans taken out by its students? If so, did that affect the 
demographic composition of enrolled students? Did Richmond mitigate the amount of its 
students’ loans by bettering their financial aid program? All of these questions are integral 
considerations in Cooper’s decision. 
D. Financial Aid 
Taking those concerns into account, one must note that the entire canvas of college 
affordability in America does not solely consist of increasing tuition prices and rising student 
debt levels. Financial aid plays a huge role in mitigating rising college costs and granting access 
to higher education to individuals from all financial backgrounds. The United States government 
historically has given a significant number of grants to American students to attend colleges. 
From 1998 until 2008, the amount of federal, state and private grants given to students has 
roughly doubled from just over $20 billion to about $45 billion.24 Furthermore, American 
students receive aid in many different forms, including “loans, grants, scholarships, government-
subsidized jobs… and tax benefits” from the federal government, state governments, higher 
education institutions, private entities, etc.25 I will further discuss the intricacies of financial aid, 
especially in relation to the pricing decisions of colleges, in the next section on the economics of 
higher education. What is important to know now though is the government’s overall position 







E. Government’s Role in Higher Education 
 The federal government takes great interest in increasing access and affordability for 
American students. The federal government’s role began in 1862 when Congress passed the 
Morrill Land-Grant Colleges Act, granting the federal government the responsibility of 
developing public universities, in order to meet the “demands of a growing, industrializing 
nation.”26 Then, roughly fifty years ago, the federal government granted colleges and students 
large subsidies with the passage of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as part of President 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society. The mission of the legislation was to “to strengthen the 
educational resources of our colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for 
students in postsecondary and higher education.”27 The act has been amended nine times since 
1965, most recently in 2008, greatly expanding the amount and types of funding available for 
institutions and students.28 Nowadays, according to the “The Condition of Education 2013" 
report released by the Department of Education, the federal government provides one-third of the 
economic expenditures on education totaling $181 billion, $146 billion of which was student 
financial aid in the form of student loans, grants, work study, etc.29 Overall, the financial role of 
the federal government in higher education has expanded greatly over time.  
Pell grants, in particular, are one notable means by which the government attempts to 
lessen costs, especially for low-income students. Only individuals with family incomes below the 
national median are eligible, and their grants occur in amounts ranging from $575 to $5,550.30 In 
2004, the federal government administered Pell grants to over five million Americans, totaling 
12.7 million dollars; in 2012 the number of recipients had increased to 9.4 million, totaling 33.5 
million dollars.31 Pell grants are just 33 percent of the Department of Education’s budget, 





loans.32 As one can see by examining Pell grants and other forms of aid, the federal government 
does act to mitigate the cost of higher education for the American student in need.   
As I will discuss later in the paper, Pell grants are an interesting component to Cooper’s 
evaluation, specifically because well-endowed universities receive scrutiny from supposedly 
exploiting Pell grants. A recent study by the New America Foundation, examining well-endowed 
universities and its percentage of Pell Grant students, found: 
“There is compelling evidence to suggest that many schools are…using Pell Grants to 
supplant institutional aid they would have provided to financially needy students 
otherwise, and then shifting these funds to help recruit wealthier students. This is one 
reason why even after historic increases in Pell Grant funding, the college-going gap 
between low income students and their wealthier counterparts remains as wide as ever.”33 
If Cooper raised the sticker-price of the University of Richmond exclusively to generate more 
revenue, and in turn did not intend to increase access to low-income, Pell Grant recipient 
students, then the decision has certain ethical implications. Though that was not Cooper’s 
intention, the national phenomenon of schools like the University of Richmond engaging in that 
behavior affects the public perception of small, private, liberal arts universities. Plus, if a larger 
gap between wealthier and poorer students enrolling at Richmond was a result of the decision, 
this too cannot be ignored in the evaluation. 
 It is also important to note that the federal government is secondary in supporting 
American postsecondary education. Its role remains quite considerable and influences the 
industry greatly, but state governments primarily fund higher education. As of late, though, 





expenditures on higher education, conducted by the Illinois State University Center for the Study 
of Higher Education, found that funds for colleges and students diminished by 7.6 percent in 
2011-12.34 Virginia itself has decreased its state higher education funding by 9.7 percent since 
2008.35 Public institutions receive the majority of public funding. Private institutions such as the 
University of Richmond, funding is much less determined by state subsidies and more so upon 
tuition revenue streams, endowment returns, gifts, grants and federal subsidies. What is 
important is that a major reason for some of the tuition increases at public universities across the 
nation is the drying up of state governmental revenue streams. The University of Richmond, 
however, does not fully feel the same effects that a public institution would in that event. Thus, 
Cooper’s tuition decision was probably grounded through a different justification than a public 
university’s president who would have made a similar decision. 
  Furthermore, the government attempts to intervene in other ways in higher education, for 
the sake of affordability. “Tuition freeze” legislation, which places a limit on tuition increases, 
sometimes gains support in government. Most of these bills occur on the state level in the short-
term, rather than on the federal level over longer periods of time. The stated goal of a tuition 
freeze, just like federal grants, is to increase accessibility to higher education for lower income 
individuals, by means of bettering affordability. Most recently in 2013, the state of Minnesota 
passed tuition freeze legislation for its public colleges and universities for the sake of increasing 
affordability.36 Kevin Kiley, in his article “Starting to Worry” mentions voluntary tuition caps 
and tuition freezes as an obvious means to control tuition price inflation, citing prominent 
schools like Middlebury and the College of the South as examples.37 Many schools do self-
implement tuition freezes. In 2000, Williams College, and in 2007, Princeton University, also 





permanence.38 Whether externally or internally imposed, though, a tuition freeze can be seen as a 
potentially useful means to increase affordability for college students.  
The concept of a tuition freeze is extremely relevant to the Cooper study. First, Cooper 
acted in a fashion almost entirely opposite to what a tuition freeze entails. Instead of halting 
tuition increases, he overtly embraced them. Though this point is relatively intuitive, it is 
necessary to understand. In the years leading up to and past 2004, there was growing sentiment 
for a federal tuition freeze bill.39 Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa was building support by 
publicly condemning well-endowed colleges, including the University of Richmond, for 
hoarding endowment returns and not controlling costs at the expense of students’ and families’ 
purses.40 Thus, in 2004, one must consider the influence of timing upon the decision, due to the 
concern over potential tuition freeze legislation which would inevitably prevent Richmond from 
implementing a substantial tuition increase in the foreseeable future. However, note that federal 
tuition freeze legislation still has not gathered enough support to be passed. 
Moreover, affordability of higher education falls under the umbrella of the broader term 
“access” to higher education. Previously, I have used the words “affordability” and “access” 
interchangeably, due to the fact that economic background is such a pertinent factor in college 
attendance. The federal government is concerned with improving access to education by other 
means as well, namely improving the information gap regarding the financial literacy of the 
American public. In 2013, President Obama has been quite outspoken about the rising costs of 
college tuition in America and its challenges for widespread access to higher education. He 
proposed the creation of a new college rating system, based upon overall “value” to students, 
through considerations of access, affordability and outcomes. The rating system is essentially in 





which supposedly misplace their emphasis on selectivity and prestige.41 The rating system would 
place emphasis on access through metrics such as the percentage of students that receives Pell 
grants, which measures a college’s enrollment rates of low income students.42 After four years, 
federal aid will become tied to institutions’ performance under the new rating system. Students 
attending high-performing, high-value schools will receive more Pell bonuses and more 
affordable student loans, with the intention of perpetuating access-granting behavior by 
universities.43  
The overall aim of the proposed rating system is that, over time, all segments of the 
American population can obtain necessary access to higher education, which high tuition prices, 
debt and exclusive behavior by universities may prevent. The problem does not necessarily 
always reside with high prices though, but rather the financial literacy barriers of which 
individuals, specifically first generation, low-income students, are unaware. Some students 
sensibly attempt to avoid loan burdens, yet run out of money before earning their degree. Certain 
qualified, lower income students do not apply to elite schools because they are unaware of 
lucrative financial aid packages. Other similarly situated students find the application process so 
overwhelming they unnecessarily forego the chance to attend a four-year college.44 For whatever 
reason, Americans do not possess all the requisite information in order to maximize access to 
higher education. The information gap is not just an emerging issue either, but was quite relevant 
in 2004 as seen by a Sallie Mae Study claiming “the data…made clear that a significant portion 
of the general population wasn't getting information on financial aid options that would enable 
them to attend the schools of their choice.”45 Again, it will be useful to see whether Cooper took 





regarding the tuition increase to the constituents of the University who were external to the 
decision-making process will be evaluated. 
F. Social Role of Higher Education 
 So far, much of the contextual discussion has pertained to the pecuniary arguments 
surrounding higher education. Economically speaking, the national conversation on higher 
education favors affordability greatly. However, there still are several arguments for the 
importance of higher education beyond its status as an economic imperative. First, the idea of 
increased access means greater representation of different demographics in the academic 
environment. One compelling argument is that increased diversity leads to better academic 
outcomes. Gurin, Dey, Hurtado and Gurin conducted a study supporting this notion, claiming 
that the informal interactions among a diverse group of individuals, such as the peer environment 
of a college campus, leads to increased democratic outcomes of civic, racial and cultural 
engagement.46 Furthermore, they also find increased exposure to diversity was significantly 
related to learning outcomes, even adjusting for individual students’ differences in aptitude when 
enrolling in college.47 As one can see, not only does heightened access and improved diversity 
better academic outcomes for those potentially pushed out of the higher education marketplace in 
the first place, but it also augments overall outcomes for everyone participating in academia.  
Similarly, the existence of a well-educated populace is another argument for higher 
education. Ancient Greek philosophers, such as Plato in The Republic, spoke about the ideal of 
education, that “what education should be [is] the art of orientation. Educators should devise the 
simplest and most effective methods of turning minds around. It…should proceed on the 
understanding that the organ already has the capacity, but is improperly aligned...”48 Many Greek 





Aristotle, knowledge and virtue are equal, both being integral for one’s soul to be wholly 
satisfied. According to the Greeks, the world is bettered by having more intellectual individuals. 
Though I would say that the American public generally does not take an Aristotelian position on 
the importance of education, one can conceive of the contagion of intelligence, the idea that 
intelligence in some generally breeds more intelligence in others. One can find the basis for this 
in social psychological research on intelligence and birth order. Psychologist Robert Zajonc finds 
that earlier-born children are more intelligent than their later-born siblings, since the former gain 
an intellectual advantage through teaching the latter.50 An extension of this argument can be 
found in the idea of peer effects in higher education, an environment where students teach one 
another quite frequently. Winston and Zimmerman conclude in their article “Peer Effects in 
Higher Education” that “it seems clear that peer effects exist – that students’ characteristics and 
behavior do…influence other students’ behavior with conventionally measured academic 
characteristics (like SAT) influencing conventionally measured academic performance (like 
GPA).”51 Sacerdote confirms the findings of Winston and Zimmerman, using a similar 
methodology with a different sample of college students.52 As one can see, increased access to 
education can lead to an intellectual betterment of society.  
In addition, some individuals propose an economic justice argument of higher education 
serving as a platform to promote societal equity and mobility through the development of an 
education-based meritocracy.  John Goldthorpe, in his paper “Education-Based Meritocracy: The 
Barriers to Its Realization” explains how higher education could potentially filter out 
considerations of privilege and class from being a major determinant of future success for 
children. If admissions to postsecondary institutions were solely based upon ability, gaining 





schooling and employment remained constant regardless of socioeconomic background, an 
education-based meritocracy could be attained.53 The United States education system, in its 
present state, most definitely does not reflect a pure meritocracy. For higher education to even do 
so would be contingent upon America’s elementary and secondary educational systems 
exhibiting similar characteristics of Goldthorpe’s ideal, which they generally do not. However, 
one can use theories like Goldthorpe’s, as well as other principles of economic justice, to 
evaluate the ethics of Cooper’s decision. Was Cooper’s intention to make Richmond a more 
diverse meritocracy, in enrollment and student outcomes, by raising tuition? Such is an important 
question to ask, considering the more privileged individuals are those who can afford the higher 
tuition prices.  
Finally, there are many other nonpecuniary benefits to higher education which society 
holds in high regard. The university environment grants students the opportunity to enjoy 
spending time in the company of their peers and participate in extracurricular activities which 
they may not be able to pursue elsewhere. Also, certain studies claim that workers with more 
schooling hold jobs that offer a greater sense of accomplishment compared to non-college 
graduates, and that college graduates tend to enjoy better health on average, controlling for 
genetic background and income.54 One of the strongest nonpecuniary benefits of a college 
education, though, is the edification of values and the exhibition of social criticism which occurs 
in higher education. Michael S. McPherson and Morton Owen Schapiro argue in their article 
“Skills, Innovations and Values: Future Needs for Postsecondary Education,” in light of future 





“Colleges and universities are now in the U.S…the place where systematic and open-
minded reflection on these matters happens. There are few social needs more important 
than maintaining, or sometimes creating, traditions of searching critique and civil 
discourse about these fundamental issues.”55 
They state that, due to rate of increase of technological advances, a college environment which 
breeds creativity, solidifies values and fosters critical thinking about vital social issues is now 
more important than ever.56 Thus, the most beneficial outcome of higher education is a better 
functioning democratic society with better informed citizens. All in all, these several arguments 
go well beyond the economic costs and benefits discussion pertaining to higher education. It will 
be interesting to see how Cooper’s decision aligns or misaligns with these various social 
arguments, amongst many others. 
G. Future Role of Higher Education 
In a similar vein to McPherson and Schapiro’s considerations about the evolving 
landscape of higher education, technological advances and other innovative practices bring great 
promise and potential for dramatic change within the enterprise. First, in the past ten years, the 
fastest growing segment of the higher education sector has been for-profit colleges and 
universities.57 From 2000-2011, enrollment in for-profit universities increased nearly 335 
percent.58 Opposed to private, well-endowed, not-for-profit universities, most for-profit schools 
offer a “vocational or technical education, either for certificates, two-year associate’s degrees, or 
bachelor’s degrees.”59 For-profit institutions intend to deliver a career enhancing education at a 
much more affordable price. The true affordability of for-profit institutions receives much 





65 percent of private, non-profit schools.60 Plus, the delinquency rates on loans for the 
supposedly more affordable, for-profit schools are nearly quadruple the rates for not-for-profit 
universities, at 15.4 percent.61 Granted, the financial backgrounds of the students attending each 
type of school vary greatly, it would seem that the returns from an education at a for-profit 
institution, at this point in time, are far less lucrative. 
Online education is also emerging at a very rapid pace. Beginning in the early 2000’s, 
many for-profit colleges incorporated online learning programs as part of their educational 
offerings. They targeted a certain segment of the market, working adults who were not suited for 
traditional higher education, and delivered to them a lower cost education typically through the 
online medium.62 Online education is recognized as a potential disruptor in higher education, 
with the ability to drastically transform the overall cost structure of the industry. Offering online 
classes is a much cheaper alternative than the high fixed costs of campus education, and many 
universities are beginning to explore online opportunities. Yet, certain schools are offering online 
courses in their curricula, yet charging the same price as traditional courses. Due to the low start-
up costs of online education, these schools are making profit margins upwards of 2000 percent, 
which draws great criticism.63 Still, other technological innovations bring great promise. 
Carnegie Mellon University’s Open Learning Initiative has developed a hybrid in-class/online 
statistics class, employed by six other public universities, in which its students perform equally 
as well as the students who enrolled in the classroom-setting version of the course.64 
Additionally, MOOC’s, or Massive Open Online Courses are on the rise. MOOC’s are free, 
online lectures taught by renowned professors, which do not limit its exposure to a certain 
number of viewers.65 Technological innovation already brings cost-effective solutions to the 





Again, the government also attempts to take an active role in spurring innovation in 
higher education. In the same 2013 proposal for educational reform which included the new 
rating system, Obama’s second stated goal is to promote innovation and competition among 
universities, in order to find the most efficient and productive educational practices. He aims for 
the federal government to act as a “catalyst for innovation” which “drives down costs while 
preserving quality.”66  The President lauds various ways that colleges have implemented cost-
effective innovations, such as awarding credits based on learning, not just time spent in class, 
using technology to replace in-class time as well as various student services, recognizing prior 
learning as well as developing accelerated degree programs. Obama also describes actions which 
the administration will take to spur innovation. Congress has developed a $260 million “First in 
the World” fund to test innovative approaches to education. Obama also intends to empower 
students with information, not just through the new rating system, but also through a 
“Datapalooza” program which presents students with even more private-sector and earnings 
information.67 More regulatory flexibility will be granted to universities as well, which will 
promote “experimental sites” for “high-quality, low-cost innovations in higher education.”68 
Most of the literature against the second portion of Obama’s plan is not necessarily critical in 
nature, but rather cautionary against the specific programs that the President mentioned. Baum 
and McPherson warn that “we have little evidence at this point about some of the ideas 
highlighted by the president as ‘best practices.’”69 They claim that the practices the President 
endorses have great potential, yet lack the empirical evidence which proves their effectiveness. 
Baum and McPherson certainly do not denounce the Presidents objective of spurring innovation; 





A significant amount of writing does exist about other innovative practices occurring 
within higher education, much involving cost-cutting strategies. Russell Osgood, former 
president of Grinnell College, supports in his article “Making Liberal Arts Colleges Sustainable” 
a three-segment academic calendar that permits students to attain credits faster and enter the 
workforce more quickly than the traditional two-semester schedule.70 He also supports 
readjustments in financial aid programs, an accomplishment of his own at Grinnell College, 
shifting funds from merit scholarships towards need-based aid.71 Also, at Brown University in 
2009, the university challenged itself to reduce expenditures by $16 million, in the wake of a 26 
percent decrease in its endowment. It did so through administrative restructuring, including 
consolidating and centralizing some support staff, instituting or increasing some fees, realigning 
the model for custodial services, optimizing the use of facilities, including for external events, 
centralizing graphic and Web design services, and centralizing general information technology 
support.72  Many of these practices are being tested by many other universities already, and many 
are yet to be even developed and implemented.  
Identifying these future trends in higher education is extremely relevant to the overall 
evaluation of Dr. Cooper’s decision. When one makes a decision to direct one’s organization in 
one specific route, there are always other alternative routes which one could have taken. Cooper 
made a groundbreaking tuition pricing decision, with the motive to enhance his institution’s 
competitive position within the higher education marketplace, in relation to other competitor 
universities. He ultimately narrowed his options to increases of $3,000, $5,000, or $7,000, 
leaning strongly towards $7,000. However, looking at the wealth of the alternatives which could 
have potentially bettered the university (e.g. possibly only raising tuition by $3,000, becoming a 





university offering more value to its prospective students), Cooper’s decision was not solely 
confined to three pricing options. Therefore, just as important as Cooper’s actual decision to 
raise tuition in order to improve Richmond’s position within the hierarchy of higher education is 
to the case study, so are all of the potential proposed alternatives which were not implemented. 
II. Economics of Higher Education 
 Up to this point, I have discussed the broad, national trends pertaining to the case study 
on Dr. William Cooper’s leadership in 2004-05. Much of the previous section pertained to 
various shifts in the national economy, governmental involvement in higher education, and the 
public discourse about the past, current and future states of higher education. At the same time, 
much of the public sentiment is based upon a relatively misguided point of view about the 
microeconomic behavior of collegiate institutions, specifically how private universities act in the 
marketplace. The economics of higher education operates in some ways similarly to the 
traditional microeconomic theory of the firm, yet functions very differently in many other key 
ways. This section will illuminate some integral features of the higher education marketplace 
which will help clarify certain elements of Cooper’s decision-making process. Two caveats: first, 
this account of the economics of higher education is entirely descriptive, describing how private 
universities actually act in the marketplace. Normative concerns, of how a firm/university ought 
to act, will be discussed later in the paper, in the evaluation of Cooper’s decision in relation to 
greater societal trends beyond economics. Second, much of the section is based upon the 
arguments in Gordon Winston’s article “Why Can’t a College Be More Like a Firm,” 
reconstructed in a manner to understand the forces influencing a university president in making 






A. Universities versus Traditional Firms 
Initially, a university and a traditional firm both exhibit some common economic 
features. The good or service supplied by an institution is the education provided to students. The 
demand is derived from the total number of students seeking a degree. The price charged for the 
education is the sticker-price, including the price of tuition, room and board, etc. The university 
has large fixed costs, such as academic buildings, laboratories, stadiums, as well as other variable 
inputs, like faculty, staff and students. Also, generally speaking, the main goal of many corporate 
leaders is to ensure the long term sustainability of their organization. College presidents are no 
different, and such requires they ensure that their institution offers the best education available 
and that they maintain/enhance financial sustainability, two goals which are definitely not 
independent of each other. Beyond these simple commonalities, however, a university and a firm 
differ distinctively. The most clear and essential difference is that competition among 
universities seems to produce higher prices of the good, rather than reduced prices as in perfect 
competition. For instance, the average price of higher education increased by 31 percent from 
2000-01 to 2010-11.73 Other critical differences will be explained below.  
B. University as a Non-Profit 
First, the tax status of collegiate institutions merits explanation. Universities have a non-
profit status and they exhibit certain behaviors of non-profit organizations accordingly. The first 
significant characteristic is the non-distribution constraint of a non-profit. Universities may make 
a profit, yet those net earnings cannot be distributed to shareholders since universities have 
none.74 Instead, a university reinvests its net earnings in itself, accumulating wealth so long as a 
surplus of earnings exists. Henry Hansmann, in his article “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise” 





considers a university finding the middle ground between both “donative” and “commercial” 
nonprofit organization.75 A donative non-profit, like the Salvation Army, receives great financial 
support from donations and gifts by individuals which care about the mission and future 
sustainability of the organization.76 Commercial non-profits, like many hospitals receive revenue 
by selling a product or service for a price.77 A university receives revenue in both of these 
manners. As a result, “donative-commercial nonprofits don’t have to charge a price that covers 
their production costs.”78 Therefore, due to their specific nature as non-profit universities, 
universities can price themselves in a manner entirely different than that of the traditional firm. I 
will return to this topic, after a discussion of student demand and educational quality.  
C. Student Demand, Selective Admissions and Educational Quality 
Remember, too, that offering the highest quality education is a priority for university 
presidents. There is great demand for an education, especially an education from a prestigious 
institution. Since wealthy schools tend to offer higher quality educations, or at least better 
perceived quality, hordes of students aspire to attend these schools. For example, there are 
currently over four million students enrolled in private, four-year colleges.79 In 2011, nearly 
30,500 prospective students applied to Harvard University, generally considered the top 
university in the nation.80 Harvard, like many other schools does not accept all applicants, but 
only those who they consider the absolute best of the best. In 2011, Harvard accepted 2,100 
students, 6.2 percent of total applicants.81 The selectivity in the admissions process creates 
excess demand, upon which universities like Harvard capitalize to maintain superlative student 
quality.  
Wealthy universities, like Harvard, are compelled to control their size, and not expand as 





amount of resources provided to each student and by only selecting the absolute best students. A 
typical firm increases its quantity supplied to match increased demand and spreads its cost across 
more units of output, in order to reach economies of scale. Yet, if universities were to expand, 
accept additional students, and lessen their selectivity, they would spread their current resources, 
like faculty and endowment earnings, over more students, potentially sacrificing educational 
quality. Educational quality is built by offering more resources per student, such as increased 
faculty-student ratios, and such is accomplished by increasing overall wealth, not just by 
“expanding sales.”82 So, schools build and uphold educational quality through admissions 
selectivity in order to create excess demand and, in turn, maximize expenditures per student, 
rather than acting as a traditional firm would and increase enrollment for the sake of more tuition 
revenue. 
An equally critical effect generated by selectivity and excess demand is the educational 
quality built by only admitting the best students possible. Student quality is integral to the 
“product” that is a higher education. Though students are a university’s customers who purchase 
the good, they doubly serve the role as an “input” in the “production process” of the good; this is 
the unique “customer-input technology” component of the higher education market.83 High 
student quality is imperative for universities. Peer effects powerfully affect the university’s 
production function, and schools do as much as possible to cultivate and solidify the existence of 
these positive effects. Students learn from their professors and from each other. As touched upon 
before, when intelligent students attend school with other intelligent students, academic 
outcomes increase for all students. When students’ peers achieve great things after graduating, it 
also reflects greatly upon all of the other students who graduated from the same university. Also, 





artistic ability, athletic ability, socioeconomic backgrounds, etc., building a diverse student body, 
which even further increases academic outcomes for all students.84 The peer effects so prevalent 
on universities everywhere incentivize enhanced selectivity in admissions, for selectivity enables 
a university to both select the best students and spend the most educational resources per student 
possible. 
D. Uncertainty: The Nature of the Good 
Other forces underlying the “customer-input” production technology also deserve further 
attention. Some of the influence again comes from a university’s not-for-profit status. In 
traditional economic theory, consumers can make reasonable estimates of the products and prices 
offered by different firms. If a person is purchasing a toaster, information is readily available to 
that individual about many firms which offer toasters for many different prices. Sometimes, due 
to the nature of the product or the circumstances pertaining to the purchase of the good, 
consumers may not be able to evaluate suitably the product or service. Non-profit firms typically 
emerge in these markets with imperfect information.85 Higher education is an investment in 
human capital which has an extreme level of uncertainty.86 The customer is ill-informed of the 
true return on investment. Economically, the student invests in greater lifetime earnings as a 
result of the education, but the level of those earnings depends on numerous variables.  
Uncertainty greatly influences the consumer and in turn, the university’s production 
technology, as does the fact that the consumer is making an irreversible decision. If an individual 
buys an inferior pair of jeans, the next time the individual can just purchase a better pair. The 
purchase of an education, on the other hand, cannot be “reversed” in the future. Gordon Winston 
likens higher education to a cure for cancer and claims that since “people simply don’t know 





considers ‘the best.’”87 Therefore, students need to look to various metrics to quell this 
uncertainty. One chief indicator, though, is price.  
E. Pricing of a University 
The pricing of a collegiate institution plays greatly into the two major goals of financial 
sustainability and educational quality. The pricing decision is both a financial accounting 
decision, based upon projected revenues and expenditures, and a marketing decision to position 
the university correctly in the marketplace.88 The price signals academic quality to prospective 
students. Due to the nature of the good as an uncertain investment, a student makes the inductive 
leap that a more expensive education from a highly selective school probably offers more 
financial resources per student, leading to a better education and a better future return on 
investment; hence, price indicates better quality. So, a high quality institution prices itself in 
relation to other high quality institutions to further that message. Some colleges care about 
perceived quality, too. Since price advertises quality, lesser quality universities may also price 
themselves with top colleges, in order to be seen as offering a high quality product and to 
increase wealth to make that perception a reality. But, those universities eventually have to 
support that price perception by actually delivering a quality education; not doing so would 
eventually lead to an unsustainable price in the market.  
Returning to Winston’s discussion about the unique pricing capabilities of “donative-
commercial” non-profits, universities support their quality of education with significant sources 
of wealth.89 Some schools manage to do so solely with tuition revenue, but other schools receive 
large amounts of other resources such as gifts and endowment wealth. Since quality partially 
drives the price, colleges can use the returns from their accrued wealth (as well as from federal 





misconstrued. The cost of an education is what a specific university spends to educate the 
student, whereas the price of the education is what the student actually pays. The “subsidy,” the 
difference between price and cost, is what is funded by the school’s other means of wealth. This 
pricing mechanism is the reason colleges are disincentivized to expand enrollment past a certain 
point, for each additional student’s tuition revenue comes at an even greater cost. Greater cost 
leads to a smaller pool of wealth from which tuition subsidies originate. For this reason, 
institutions practice selectivity.90 
To further this distinction, imagine this pricing methodology occurring in a traditional 
marketplace.  A stereo shop owner sells a stereo worth $200 dollars to a customer for $80, 
making up the $120 difference with funds earmarked towards lessening the burden of stereo 
sales from the local town government and interest from the stereo shop’s savings account. Better 
yet, imagine if a university priced its good as a traditional firm does. Sticker-prices would 
certainly receive much more scrutiny than they already do. If the University of Richmond in 
2013-14 priced itself as a firm, then its sticker-price would have to at least cover its average cost 
per student of $78,253, a figure well above its sticker-price of $55,590.91 Thus, unlike the 
traditional pricing and profit formula in microeconomics, the pricing formula in higher education 
is: 
STICKER PRICE = COST – SUBSIDY 
F. The Subsidy and Financial Aid 
Now, one important thing to note is that a university provides a subsidy to all of its 
students, and not just students with less fortunate financial backgrounds. Every student pays less 
than the average cost per student; yet, some students pay even less than that, receiving an even 





population via price discrimination. Universities lessen individuals’ sticker prices through a 
financial aid formula specifically according to certain students’ abilities-to-pay, eventually 
finding the market-clearing price for all. The subsidy leads to the idea of the net tuition of 
universities. Net tuition is a key indicator of an institution’s affordability. Since tuition subsidies 
are increased for less wealthy individuals, net tuition varies greatly in reference to the varying 
financial backgrounds of matriculated students. 
Moreover, since many people cannot afford the cost of a university by itself, the 
existence of this subsidy, derived from endowment returns, private gifts, reallocated tuition 
revenues, federal and state subsidies, etc., is necessary. One can then deduce that the wealthier 
the school, the greater the subsidy the school can offer its prospective students, since their annual 
earnings are simply larger. As the ability to offer a greater subsidy increases, the school then 
potentially becomes much more affordable to all segments of the population, because of the 
potential financial aid mark-down. Additionally, schools can also use the tuition of wealthy, full-
paying students and reallocate a certain amount of that revenue to offer an even greater subsidy 
for lower-income students. Therefore, a combination of endowment and tuition revenue supports 
generous financial aid programs. So, due to the workings of the market, wealthy, well-endowed 
universities can raise their price of attendance, in order to offer the greatest subsidies possible to 
their students, in order to increase access by means of affordability. 
Similarly, the ability to offer a large subsidy influences the type of financial aid a school 
can offer. The more wealth a university possesses, the more freedom a university has over the 
composition and the application of its subsidies. Schools with enough financial flexibility can 
offer need-blind admissions to students, which too communicates positive messages of 





school possesses enough funds to make your education affordable upon admission. Catherine 
Hill, Gordon Winston and Stephanie Boyd, in their study “Access: Net Prices, Affordability, and 
Equity At A Highly Selective College” measure net tuition prices across all income quintiles at 
Williams College, an institution representative of many of the highly selective, wealthy colleges 
able to offer large subsidies to its students. They attempt to measure, while tuition price levels 
keep increasing, whether net tuition levels maintain affordability for students from all income 
backgrounds at the most expensive schools.  They conclude that the answer to the question, “Can 
a highly able low income kid reasonably aspire to go to an expensive and highly selective 
college?” is clearly “yes.”92 They prove a key characteristic of the market for higher education. 
Not only are the wealthiest, most selective, highest quality schools the most expensive, but they 
are also the most affordable for middle and low-income students! Wealth drives affordability. 
One can see that the financial aid practices of the wealthiest schools facilitate 
affordability for all potential students. As a result, it would seem that a paradox of access is 
created within these schools. Students, from any financial background, have the opportunity to 
attend a university like Harvard or Princeton without the constraints of affordability. The subsidy 
offerings widen the pool of applicants with the best ability, increasing the student demand for the 
more affluent schools which can offer a greater discount. Yet, at the same time, stringent 
selectivity practices exponentially decrease any one student’s likelihood of actually attaining 
education from a school like Harvard or Stanford. Again, the total wealth a school possesses 
proves to be so vital to all things relevant in the market for higher education, such as excess 
student demand facilitating increased selectivity, superlative educational quality, and lucrative 





As a result, subsidy management is crucial for universities. Even the wealthiest schools, 
like Harvard and Yale, which have respective endowments of $31.7 billion and $19 billion, 
continue to rigorously manage their finances.93  Less wealthy schools need to more carefully 
balance the amount of full-paying students admitted with subsidy-receiving students, in order to 
efficiently reallocate tuition revenue to offer greater subsidies for all students. They do so 
through rigorous enrollment management, prudently calculating admissions yield in order to 
accurately project tuition revenues.  
G. The Arms Race in Higher Education 
Likewise, referring to the “customer-input technology” concept prevalent in higher 
education, universities ardently compete amongst each other over the quality of their inputs. This 
pressure from the competition leads to a pressure to increase expenditures, so long as it is 
financial feasible (which is usually the case for the wealthier schools). Colleges strive to offer the 
best faculty and facilities in order to attract the best students, and then strive to possess the best 
faculty, facilities and students in order to continue attracting the best students. This perpetuating 
practice is referred to as the “arms race” in higher education. Winston, in his article, “The 
Positional Arms Race in Higher Education” explains the phenomenon as having “no finish line 
that indicates success. It is a continuing process that can be ended only by ending the process 
itself.”94 While maximizing expenditures on academic endeavors integral to attracting 
superlative students and faculty, schools tend to also spend greatly on other aspects of campus 
life. Universities build more deluxe dormitories, enrich campus dining options and increase 
leisure opportunities for students, which may better satisfy consumer preferences, but critics 
declare as unnecessary luxury expenditures.95 McPherson and Winston claim “cost is a problem 





themselves from competitor schools, universities rack up expenses and cater to these “student 
demands.” 
The ranking systems are some of what drives this arms race of ever-increasing spending 
by which schools compare themselves to each other. The US News and World Report ranking 
system, the most renowned, is one way in which schools assess themselves against the 
competition by means of student quality, selectivity, prestige, and educational quality. It gives 
validation to the market competition and gives schools the ability to annually benchmark 
themselves against others. Not only that, but the ranking systems give feedback to the students 
who are making that uncertain, irreversible investment in their own human capital. Thus, ranking 
systems confirm the quality of the school to other schools as well as the customer-base, the 
students.  
Monks and Ehrenberg study the effects of the US News and World Report rankings on 
academic outcomes. They find that an increase in rank (e.g. moving from first to third) leads an 
institution to accept more applicants, at a less favorable (larger) rate, resulting in an admitted 
class of lower student quality (lower average SAT scores); a dire consequence for any institution 
within this marketplace.97 Monks and Ehrenberg confirm that ranking systems matter a great deal 
to both schools and students. Students want to go to the best school possible, by means of 
ranking. Schools want the best students, so they need to maintain or better their ranking.  In order 
to improve their ranking, it typically involves an increase in expenditures. Therefore, the arms 
race phenomenon is a widespread effect in the economics of higher education, which definitely 







H. Hierarchy Model of Higher Education 
All in all, the common denominator of all these significant features of the higher 
education marketplace is the amount of wealth a university possesses, through endowments and 
gifts, tuition revenues, federal and state subsidies, etc. As a result, the economic structure of 
higher education is considered a “hierarchy” of wealth.98 The schools on the top of the hierarchy 
are the wealthiest schools charging the most, granting the greatest subsidies for its students via 
the most generous financial aid packages, implementing the most selective admissions policies, 
admitting the highest quality students and ultimately offering the best educational quality. 
Schools in the middle of the hierarchy, those with moderate wealth, find themselves dependent 
more upon tuition revenue and limited in their subsidy offerings, thus they are constrained by 
extensive enrollment management. At the bottom of the hierarchy, are the schools with excess 
supply, fighting just to find paying students willing to attend their institutions.99 In order to 
survive and thrive in this hierarchy, schools need to find ways to climb into the higher tiers, by 
either increasing overall wealth, bettering the quality of the education offered, or a multifaceted 
combination of both. In this entire section, great focus was placed upon the wealthiest of schools 
because they are the market leaders. Winston refers to these schools as the “winner-takes-all” 
schools, for their wealth directly influences their prestige, selectivity and student quality, which, 
in turn, continually builds more and more wealth.100 The more wealth a university enjoys, the 
easier it is to obtain better student quality. The better quality of students enrolled at the school, 
the easier it is for the school to maintain its wealth over time. Thus, all schools strive to be on top 
of the hierarchy of higher education and constantly seek creative ways to rise there.  This fact of 







In conclusion, there are unique and complex macro- and microeconomic influences on a 
university. Notice how on a macro level the wealthiest schools appear the least affordable, while 
on a micro level they are actually the most affordable. A college president wants to better the 
quality of education offered by his/her university and strengthen the sustainability of his/her 
university’s financial position. Within the higher education marketplace, the university needs to 
recognize where it is amongst the overall hierarchy, in relation to its competitor schools. The 
main metric of determining a university’s position in the hierarchy is wealth. In order to better 
the product offered the university needs to secure and build upon its wealth by increasing tuition, 
receiving more donations, or both. Just as important is the quality of education offered by the 
school, built through admissions selectivity, which allows the school to admit the highest quality 
students possible and to maximize the amount of wealth spent per student. By doing so, the 
school increases the potential subsidy offered to all its students, subsequently increasing 
accessibility to the institution, solidifying a diverse, highly-able student population.  
Reflecting on the inner-workings of the market, one now has an arsenal of questions to 
ask in order to fully evaluate Dr. Cooper’s decision. What was the position of Richmond in the 
higher education marketplace? How much was tuition and how large was the endowment? Was 
there any potential of a large donation in the future? How many students were applying to the 
university, what was the overall quality of those students, and what was the acceptance rate? 
What was the general financial background of the students and how diverse were incoming 
classes? What did Richmond’s financial aid program look like and was it fully need-blind? What 
was the overall expenditure level of the university and did it plan to increase in the future? Who 





these considerations? Now that we know the economic framework, we can ask the important 
questions about Cooper’s tuition increase decision. We now can also assess the institutional 
effectiveness of the decision, by answering these questions.   
III. Context of the University of Richmond 
Up to this point, this chapter has narrowed its scope from the larger, societal forces 
influencing the higher education industry to the unique complexities of the higher education 
marketplace. It is time now to further focus upon some specific contextual elements of the 
University of Richmond that relate to Dr. Cooper’s leadership in 2004-05. Integral to Dr. 
Cooper’s decision to increase the university's tuition are several historical occurrences that 
shaped the university’s cultural anatomy and financial composition in the early 2000’s. 
Similarly, certain trends within the tenures of the former University of Richmond presidents 
influenced the leadership of Dr. Cooper, both directly and indirectly. I will discuss both of these 
topics through a brief history of the University of Richmond.  
A. Brief History of the University 
 The University of Richmond was founded in 1830 as the Virginia Baptist Education 
Society by the Baptist General Association of Virginia as a preparatory institute for young men 
desiring to become ministers at Columbian College in Washington D.C. Ten years later, after the 
addition of a literature department, the school was chartered as the Baptist seminary, Richmond 
College. In its early days, the school struggled with some financial woes and at one point 
invested all of its funds in Confederate war bonds – becoming bankrupt after the Civil War. The 
school reopened in 1866 after a $5,000 donation by a trustee. In 1894, the college elected 





1945. In 1914, his most notable and evident accomplishment was raising the necessary funds, 
with the help of donors like J.D. Rockefeller, to move the college from its original location in the 
city of Richmond to a new 350-acre campus located outside of the city. At the same time, he 
founded the Westhampton College for women, creating the University of Richmond’s coordinate 
college system that still exists in 2014. President Boatwright was said to have “worked diligently 
and with remarkable success in leading Richmond College from antiquated methods and 
relatively low standards to high levels of achievement among institutions of learning”101 The 
school truly began to thrive under the tenure of President Boatwright.   
Years later, in 1969, one of the most pivotal events at the University of Richmond 
occurred. E. Claiborne Robins, the Chief Executive Officer of A.H. Robins, Inc. and a Richmond 
alumnus from the class of 1933, donated roughly $50 million to the university. The gift consisted 
of $40 million in the form of common stock in the A. H. Robins Company and an additional $10 
million earmarked as a challenge gift for matching funds to be raised by the university over the 
next ten-year period.102 H. Gerald Quigg, the university’s Vice President of Development at the 
time, directed the successful matching effort, ultimately leading to a $60 million addition to the 
university’s endowment assets.103 Robins’ donation is worth more than six times that amount in 
today’s dollars, making it one of the largest donations to a university ever.104 In addition to that 
one-time contribution in 1969, Robins and his family donated roughly $175 million to the 
university over his lifetime, markedly solidifying the financial position of institution.   
Not only did “The Gift” evidently make the University of Richmond one of the wealthiest 
schools in the nation, it also significantly altered the leadership structure of the institution. In 
1830, the Virginia Baptist Educational Society founded Richmond College, which evolved into 





Virginia nominated all members of the university’s Board of Trustees. However, the status quo 
ended in 1969 since Robins’ financial assistance was contingent upon the condition that the 
university’s charter be changed to release the university from the sole control of Richmond's 
Baptist General Association. Following the amendment, only eight of the forty members of the 
board were to represent the Baptist General Board.105 As a result, E. Claiborne Robins generated 
considerable financial possibilities for the institution and noticeably altered those involved in the 
realization of Richmond's newfound potential. 
Before the tenure of Dr. Cooper, two other presidents with tenures of significance were 
Dr. E. Bruce Heilman (1971-1986) and Dr. Richard L. Morrill (1988-1998). Under each 
president, the school exhibited two common trends: fundraising and strategic planning. Bruce 
Heilman, as soon as he was named president of the university, embarked upon the "Our Time in 
History" campaign, pledging to raise $50 million in ten years. The campaign was completed in 
eight years and was oversubscribed by $4 million.106 Several other campaigns were conducted 
before Dr. Cooper's tenure raising over $100 million. As a result, the 1970's and the 1980's saw a 
boom in the construction and renovation of numerous academic, residential and athletic 
buildings on campus, such as the Robins Center, the Gottwald Science Center, the Heilman 
Dining Center and the Tyler Haynes Commons. Also, the development of many scholarship 
programs still in existence today occurred, as well as the establishment of new professorships 
and chairs, amongst many other things.107 Aggressive fundraising brought with it aggressive 
increases in university expenditures. As a result, the university prospered.  
The trend of aggressive fundraising and generous giving, though, served as means to the 
end of the various strategic plans developed throughout Richmond's history. University 





unified mission or a collective set of goals. W. Harrison Daniel in his History of the University of 
Richmond notes that "between 1969 and 1999...planning...was a never-ending process..." and it 
occurred almost to the university's detriment.108 The university enacted several planning 
endeavors in the 1970’s and ‘80’s, some resulting in conflicting or overlapping goals and 
initiatives.109 One strategic plan in the early 1980’s recommended that the “university’s 
enrollment…remain at approximately the current level to insure continuation of quality 
education; the admissions program would be broadened in an effort to recruit able students from 
wider socio-economic and geographic backgrounds; increase funds for need-based 
scholarships…” – all findings which should sound highly familiar after reading the previous 
section on the economics of higher education. One common theme found within the university's 
various planning initiatives was the improvement of the school's diversity and international 
focus.110 A school which only admitted its first black student in 1970 progressed to having a 
minority student population of 11.6 percent in 1995.111 Additionally, a shifting of resources 
towards developing a wide range of study abroad programs occurred in the 1980’s and 1990’s.112 
Overall, the school continually sought to become "the best university of its size and type in the 
nation.”113  
Reflecting on the historical trends of the two tenures previous to Dr. Cooper's, one can 
began to note how they could have influenced Cooper's leadership of the university. The 
university had a thirty-year pattern of continual fundraising and planning that Cooper had to 
uphold. We can ask then, how did the decision fit in with these enduring trends? Was the tuition 
increase a response to a lack of revenue from fundraising? Was the tuition increase independent 
from fundraising considerations and a separate part of Cooper's vision and plan? What was 





considerations with those of the former presidents and was he better able to achieve these via a 
tuition increase? Again, these are among the pertinent questions to ask when evaluating Dr. 
Cooper's leadership. The important takeaways from the brief history of the university are its 
large levels of wealth, its straying away from its Baptist roots, its rich history of giving and 
alumni activity, its penchant for five- and ten-year strategic plans, its yearning for more 
socioeconomic diversity and, ultimately, its desire to be the best school of its “type” (whatever 
type that may be.)  
B. The Position of the University in Relation to its Competitor Schools  
 Reflecting on the historical trends of the University of Richmond, especially its affluent 
heritage of alumni activity and gift-giving, and taking into account the economic priorities of 
wealthy universities per the discussion in section two, it will be useful to examine Richmond’s 
position in the higher education marketplace leading up to 2004-05. Dr. Cooper’s decision to 
increase tuition revealed the obvious fact that he felt certain aspects of the status quo were 
insufficient and in need of improvement. As Dr. Cooper wrote in his own Richmond Times 
Dispatch editorial, in line with the mission of E. Claiborne Robins, he wanted “Richmond to be 
recognized as the nation’s best small private university” and that in order to do so “we have 
looked upon best practices at our peer and aspirant schools. The intention, however, has never 
been to become like any of these schools.”114  Therefore, equally important to this discussion 
about Richmond’s position are the various positions of its competitor schools. In the “University 
of Richmond’s 2004-05 Fact Book,” university leaders listed ten specific peer and aspirant 
schools against which the university benchmarked evaluated itself. The peer schools are 





and Wesleyan University, while the aspirant schools are Colgate University, Dartmouth College, 
Davidson College, Princeton University, Rice University.115  
 Initially, one must recognize the unique business model of the University of Richmond in 
the larger economic marketplace of higher education. The University of Richmond is officially 
classified a small, private, liberal arts institution. However, it is somewhat significantly unlike 
other liberal arts colleges with which it is grouped. The university is composed of five individual 
schools, rather than just one main college of Arts and Sciences. As a result, it must spread its 
pool of resources over five entities in lieu of devoting them all to the liberal arts. The University 
also generally has a larger enrollment, averaging around 3,000 students, than traditional liberal 
arts colleges, making high levels of selectivity harder to attain. Additionally, the school chooses 
to support a Division-I athletic program, another area of great expenditure. At the same time, the 
University of Richmond is very unlike certain larger, research universities with which it 
competes due to its liberal arts status, enrollment size, number of graduate and doctorate 
programs offered, etc.116 The university thus finds itself having a complex and unique identity, 
making it more challenging to compare, at least rankings-wise, against many other schools in 
order to officially be “recognized as the nation’s best small private university.”117  The 
University of Richmond does not fit easily into one definitive, institutional classification.  
 The uniqueness of Richmond’s business model also necessitates distinctive choices in the 
University’s tuition planning. During Cooper’s tenure, aside from 2001-02 when the sticker-
price increased by 12 percent, the university consistently increased its sticker-price by five 
percent annually, roughly double the rate of inflation.118 In the academic year of 2004-05, the 
University of Richmond positioned itself as a “best value” institution in comparison to other 





University of Richmond was definitely underpriced compared to its peer and aspirant schools. 
When examining its ten declared competitor schools, Richmond was steadily below their average 
sticker-price until 2005-06 when the 31 percent tuition increase was implemented, as seen by the 
graph below: 
 
 The University of Richmond’s endowment in 2004 was roughly $1.1 billion, the 42nd 
largest endowment in the nation. Though dwarfed by certain prestigious institutions’ monstrous, 
multi-billion dollar endowments, of the ten peer and aspirant schools against which it measured 
itself, Richmond’s endowment was fourth largest and first among the peer schools. The 
university’s endowment per full-time, undergraduate student also was fourth among the ten 
schools, amounting to $369,422.119 During Cooper’s tenure the endowment hovered around 
roughly $1 billion consistently.120 In 2003-04 and 2004-05, the endowment had increased by 
roughly 10 percent each year, exhibiting positive signs of growth. Although the university's 
endowment was sizeable, it accounted for only 27 percent of the institution's total operating 
budget.121 The operating revenue of the university in 2004-05 was roughly $158.5 million, and 





accounting for financial aid and scholarship discounts, totaled to roughly $69.6 million, 44 
percent of the school’s total operating revenue.123 Clearly, despite the magnitude of the 
endowment, in 2004 the University of Richmond was still relatively dependent on tuition 
revenue. 
 In addition to revenue from the endowment and tuition, the University of Richmond also 
receives a decent portion of its revenue from gifts. As stated previously, one must again note that 
Richmond has a rich history of alumni giving. In 2004-05, the university received roughly $18.9 
million in gifts and grants, a figure which was 13 percent of total expenditures.124 There were 
several unsettling trends in advancement during Cooper’s presidency. First, in the eight years 
leading up to 2004-05, both alumni donative participation and alumni gifts had decreased. In 
1997-98, 39 percent of alumni donated to the university and alumni gifts totaled to $12.5 million 
dollars.125 In 2004-05, only 28 percent of alumni donated and alumni gifts totaled to $4.6 million 
dollars – an eight million dollar difference in eight years.126 The average alumni gift had dropped 
from $1,379 in 1997-98 to $515 dollars in 2004-05.127 Though one must recognize that there was 
a recession in the early 2000’s as a potential cause of the dip in donations, one must also realize 
that Richmond had the lowest alumni donative participation rates of its competitor schools. 
There were some favorable trends, however. By 2004-05, corporate gifts totaled $5.4 million, a 
figure had increased by over 500 percent from 1997-98. Gifts from friends/parents had also 
doubled over the same timeframe, reaching $4.7 million in 2004-05.128     
 Furthermore, as has already been established, the University of Richmond was a wealthy 
school which offered an education of great value. Such was evident not only by its underpriced 
tuition levels, but also through its financial aid offerings. In 2004, the school granted a total of 





Cooper’s presidency.129 At the time, Richmond was aiming to financially solidify its policy 
stance of being one of fewer than forty institutions in the nation that was both need-blind in its 
admissions review of potential students and guaranteed need-based aid to meet the full, 
demonstrated need for qualified undergraduates.130 65 percent of Richmond students received 
some sort of financial aid to attend the university.131 Of its ten main competitor schools, only 
Rice, Princeton, Davidson and Dartmouth could offer the same generous policies of need-blind 
admissions and meeting full, demonstrated financial aid as the University of Richmond.132 In 
fact, even today only forty-five schools in the nation have the ability to offer a financial aid 
policy of this nature.133 
Aside from tuition levels, endowment size, alumni giving levels and financial aid 
policies, another way to determine a university’s official position in the marketplace is through 
the various ranking systems, most notably US News and World Report. As of 2014, the school is 
rated against other national liberal arts institutions in the US News and World Report rankings. 
However, in 2004 the university was at a severe competitive disadvantage in the rating system. 
The university was only ranked as a regional institution, and not under a national university or 
national liberal arts classification. Regional colleges have a distinct undergraduate focus, but 
only draw students from the surrounding areas and grant fewer than half their degrees in liberal 
arts disciplines.134 Though at the time the university was the number one school in the southern 
region, it lacked the national standing which all of its ten competitor schools received. The 
university was not obviously lacking in the key criteria of the traditional ranking systems, in 
selectivity and student quality (via SAT scores). However, if the university sought to become one 
of the country’s finest, private institutions of its size, it needed to act in some way to attain even 





Finally, certain features of the University of Richmond’s enrollment are contextually 
relevant to Dr. Cooper’s decision. First, in 2004-05, the university admitted 41 percent of its 
5,780 applicants, resulting in a yield of 775 students.135 The university had become more 
selective than years beforehand, when in 1995 the school admitting 55 percent of its applicants. 
But, universities pride themselves on selectivity and the fact that in 2004-05 the university’s 
acceptance rate was tied for the second highest of its competitor schools revealed a definite area 
of needed improvement.136 Applications were not necessarily on the rise either. From 1997-98 to 
2004-05, the number of applicants generally fluctuated between 5,700 and 6,000, showing no 
real signs of future increase. However, the quality of admitted students was increasing during 
Cooper’s presidency. The SAT middle 50% range for both men and women increased from 
1200-1330 in 1998 to 1260-1380 in 2004.137 Moreover, in 2004-05 university possessed a 12 
percent minority and foreign student population, a significant increase from a 6 percent 
representation of minority and foreign full-time undergraduates in May 1991.138 Historically, 
diversity was lacking at the University of Richmond, but at the same time its improvement was a 
priority for university leaders. In 2003, the University issued the Common Ground Commission 
in order to improve diversity and multiculturalism on campus. Both admissions and the campus 
community were focused upon making the University of Richmond a more diverse institution 
and during Cooper’s tenure the school was definitely making progress, with more to be had in 
the future.   
 All in all, during Cooper’s presidency up to 2004-05, the University of Richmond was 
definitely improving its position in the higher education market. The school had its market niche 
as an underpriced, best value institution (which it would soon abandon). The university enjoyed a 





policies. The university faced some competitive obstacles such as its unique, five-school 
business model (which is not necessarily an obstacle) and its regional ranking. Also, the 
university showed some areas for improvement in advancement, admissions selectivity, student 
quality and diversity. What is important from this section is that we now have an institutional 
baseline by which to compare the trends after the tuition increase in order to notice the true 
effects of the tuition increase on the key areas of the University of Richmond.  
C. Shared Governance 
 After taking note of the competitive position of the University of Richmond in relation to 
its competition, one last contextual element which factors greatly into Dr. Cooper’s decision is 
the concept of shared governance. Shared governance is the name given to the formal leadership 
configuration and decision-making process of an institution of higher education. Whereas 
typically a corporation is run in a very top-down manner, with the Board of Directors, the Chief 
Executive Officer and other high level executives making decisions which are then imparted to 
the rest of the organization, universities typically make decisions in a much more collegial and 
participatory manner from all levels of the university. Shared governance can be described as “a 
delicate balance between faculty and staff participation in planning and decision-making 
processes.”139 It involves parties such as the governing board, the president, other top officers, 
administrative and academic leaders, varying number of faculty, and even students in some 
instances with key decision-making processes. Additionally, authority is differentiated and 
spread across many facets of the university hierarchy in specific areas for decision-making. It is 
widely understood that broad participation in decision-making increases the level of employee 
investment in the institution’s success and improves productivity in organizations. In higher 





the best position to provide the institutional history so valuable to institutional planning.140 Thus, 
university governance is a much more collaborative venture than the governance of other 
institutions.  
 However, the leadership construct of shared governance presents different challenges to a 
university president than to leaders of other types of organizations. Richard Morrill, in his book 
Strategic Leadership, claims that “the most influential analyses of the college presidency 
conclude that it is structurally weak in authority beyond whatever strengths and talents a given 
individuals may bring to it” and that “university presidents operate from one of the most anemic 
power bases in any of the major institutions in American society.”141 Since shared governance 
spreads decision-making power across several organizational tiers, the university president must 
be sensitive to each of these decision-making agents or constituencies in a key decision-making 
process. The president is wedged between a governing board with ultimate legal authority and 
the constituencies beneath him or her which also have significant power and a structural 
expectation of consultation. The executive independence that a typical chief executive enjoys, a 
university president may yearn for. What’s more, many individuals still view a university 
president in the same manner as a traditional executive in the realm of accountability. Presidents 
are held responsible for decision or events over which they have little authority and control. 
Whereas such is a common complaint of many individuals who hold positions of authority, the 
disparity between responsibility and authority for a university president is much larger than that 
of a typical executive.142  
 The discussion of shared governance is the final and possibly most important contextual 
piece needed to evaluate Dr. Cooper’s decision. Dr. Cooper needed to garner support from 





have to do. Increasing the tuition of the University of Richmond by 31 percent and changing the 
institution’s image from a “best-value” to a “price-leading” market player is most definitely a 
key institutional decision. The shared governance system is the institutional maze through which 
Cooper had to advance his vision and his plan for the University of Richmond. The degree of 
dexterity with which Cooper navigated through the University of Richmond’s system of shared 
governance will be extremely exciting to uncover and assess. His methods of communication and 
persuasion which he applied on each level to each essential constituency are extremely 
important. Who were the key constituencies in this decision-making process? How did he create 
buy-in for such a large decision? Did he neglect any constituency in the decision-making 
process? How congruent are the theory and the practice of the system of shared governance at 
the University of Richmond? Is the power base of the Richmond presidency as anemic as Morrill 
attests, such that Dr. Cooper possessed enough individual, executive competence to enact such a 
groundbreaking decision? The shared governance conversation finally provides us with a 
tangible leadership context to both understand and benchmark Cooper’s leadership. These 
questions, and more, will help to finalize the discussion of whether Dr. Cooper’s decision was an 












Chapter Two: Case Study on Dr. William Cooper’s Decision 
I. Narrative of the Decision 
A. Visions of Previous Presidents  
As stated previously, the main institutional goal of the University of Richmond, distinctly 
beginning in 1971 with the Presidential appointment of Dr. Bruce Heilman, was for the 
university to become “the best, small private university in the country.”143 That specific goal did 
not stray from the forefront in any of the terms of the three major Richmond presidents from 
1971 to 2006 (excluding Dr. Samuel Banks who served a brief one year term from 1986-1987). 
The goal was consistent with that of a traditional nonprofit entity. This institution of higher 
education sought to become the best at what it offers to its constituents, a top quality liberal 
education. The additional distinction of “best, small private university” clarifies the goal even 
further, narrowing Richmond’s scope of competitors by which the university will compare itself, 
and further delineating other contingent priorities, such as selectivity, student-faculty ratios, 
endowment per student, etc. specific to this type of institution. Additionally, equally as important 
to a leader’s vision and goals is the manner in which he implements his/her goals. The means by 
which these three men went about moving the university towards this common end definitely 
differed, each building upon the accomplishments of his predecessors and then taking his own 
approach to bettering the institution. A broad run-through of Dr. Cooper’s predecessors will help 
illuminate his leadership during his tenure.  
 Dr. Bruce Heilman was an excellent fundraiser, known for orchestrating “The Gift” from 
E. Claiborne Robins at the commencement of his presidency, conducting many extremely 
successful capital campaigns for the university, building many of the beautiful academic 





throughout the end of the century. On Tuesday, February 4, 2014, I had the privilege of sitting 
down for breakfast with Dr. Heilman and he revealed much to me about his vision for the 
institution and his accomplishments during his presidency. Upon his arrival at the University of 
Richmond in 1971 from Meredith College in Raleigh, North Carolina, the school was poorly 
endowed, faculty salaries were too low, the financial aid budget was poor, the grounds were in 
disrepair and the university was not portraying itself in the appropriate manner to convey itself as 
the “best university of its type.”144 Dr. Heilman determined that his organization needed financial 
resources most at that point in time. Today he still asserts “money is the essence” of how a 
university operates; in order for the University of Richmond to attain its lofty goals, it needed a 
much firmer financial backbone.145 Once the university began to accrue more wealth through Dr. 
Heilman’s relentless fundraising efforts, it could begin to act accordingly in order to portray a 
better image of prestige and educational value to its consumers and competitors. Dr. Heilman 
knew the importance of both the perception and the reality of quality in the higher education 
marketplace. He too implemented several fairly large tuition increases during his tenure, and also 
devoted a large amount of his accrued resources into structural additions and improvements to 
the university.146  
Generally, Dr. Heilman’s leadership style, especially in the fundraising domain, seemed 
to be of a very relational nature, finding his way into the pockets of alumni and corporate donors 
through warm, good-natured charm and quick wit. One especially telling quote that exemplifies 
Dr. Heilman’s approach to the presidency was, upon hearing of the potential $50 million 
donation from E. Claiborne Robins, Dr. Heilman reflected fondly, with a twinkle in his eye, 
saying “any man who is willing to give $50 million to a university must have a lot more to 





his Board of Trustees constantly to contribute financially– or else he would move to replace you 
with another more freely spending individual. Yet, Dr. Heilman also knew institutional wealth 
was still a means to an end, the end of becoming “the best, small private university in the 
country.” By the conclusion of his term in 1986, he had helped solidify the endowment of the 
university to an unprecedented level (for the University of Richmond), doubled faculty salaries 
and heightened the campus exterior into something of enviable beauty – piloting the University 
of Richmond into the right direction towards attaining its ultimate goal.148  
 Also, on February 3rd, 2014 I had the honor to speak with Dr. Richard Morrill, Dr. 
Heilman’s successor as President at the University. Dr. Morrill also recognized the significance 
of improving the university’s financial position. Fortunately for him, during his presidency from 
1988 to 1998, Richmond’s endowment wealth grew relatively organically from roughly $200 
million to roughly $800 million, mostly due to the influence of the Robins family as well as 
positive market forces and the fundraising culture developed by Dr. Heilman.149 The university 
enjoyed almost no deferred maintenance at the time, either.150 Since the university’s wealth grew 
exponentially before and during Dr. Morrill’s tenure, Dr. Morrill could place emphasis on his 
special area of leadership expertise, strategic planning. Through careful, deliberate, and strategic 
action-steps and goal, Dr. Morrill directed the institution towards improvements in many other 
facets, since “the University of Richmond’s financial position [was] rock solid…and able to 
sustain [such an increased] level of educational investment.”151 As stated previously, he placed 
great emphasis on expanding financial aid, increasing diversity, and attracting higher quality 
students to attend the university. Another initiative of his, a testament to his strategic and 
integrative leadership style, involved joining the academic and administrative governing bodies 





planning and budgetary subcommittee comprising faculty and administration members that 
reviews and shapes the university initiatives.152 Though it was not a groundbreaking alteration to 
campus operations, the committee would serve to unite both factions of university governance in 
many future decision-making processes, including those involving substantial tuition increases. 
Dr. Morrill conceptualized this body as helping to maintain a university ethos of a strong liberal 
arts education merged with the administrative realities of cost-effectiveness. Ultimately, Dr. 
Morrill aimed to increase the academic quality of the university through strategic and disciplined 
planning that maximized the potential of the university’s endowed wealth and diverse revenue 
streams.  
B. Dr. Cooper’s General Vision 
In 1998, the university appointed Dr. William Cooper as president. Dr. Cooper made 
known his ambitious aspirations for the University of Richmond and became recognized for his 
penchant for change. I had the pleasure of sitting down to speak formally with Dr. Cooper on 
February 17th, 2014, in addition to corresponding with him on several other occasions, and much 
of the information surrounding the decision comes from him firsthand. Upon his arrival at the 
university, the Board of Trustees urged him to adopt a plan to transform Richmond into a 
“Williams-plus” university, an interesting re-articulation of the university’s enduring goal of 
becoming the “best small private university of its type”153 Together, Dr. Cooper and the Board of 
Trustees sought to become the nation’s highest quality liberal arts university, like Williams 
College, while maintaining the relatively larger size and more complex academic composition of 
the University of Richmond. Dr. Cooper immediately recognized the mismatch between the 
university’s financial model and its long-term goals of becoming “Williams-plus” or a 





their smaller enrollment size and a long history of wealth and academic excellence. As a result, 
these schools possess the privilege of greater per capita resources. For Richmond to attain a 
similar level of resources, it would have to downsize to match the enrollment size of its aspirant 
schools (which would decrease revenue accordingly) or seek to increase revenue elsewhere.155 
Dr. Cooper realized that if he were to attain the University of Richmond’s lofty goals, he 
absolutely needed to adjust the university’s current financing model and greatly increase the 
revenue streams into the university via fundraising, tuition and room and board, amongst other 
things.156 Dr. Cooper, from the onset, clearly saw what he wanted the university to become under 
his leadership. He just had to find the financial means in order to achieve his goals.  
From the start, Dr. Cooper set forth on a two-year process to create and implement a ten-
year master strategic plan, a formal articulation of the manner in which he would turn the 
university into a “Swarthmore-plus” university. Its “guiding design feature” was “the primacy of 
student learning;” improving institutional academic quality was one of Dr. Cooper’s primary 
objectives.157 He also declared the strategic plan would include a “few carefully chosen, bold 
initiatives” for faculty hiring, admissions, financial campaigns and student life, amongst many 
other secondary objectives.158 Though he recognized the need for increases in revenue in order to 
reach long-term goals, some of his first steps at the University actually pertained to streamlining 
expenditures. He notably eliminated the position of Provost upon the former Provost’s retirement 
as well as the school’s Graduate Education Program and Health and Sports Sciences 
Department.159 He also aimed to increase the number of Friday classes since he felt current 
academic operations resulted in too much unused capital.160 Many of these initial achievements 
he attributed to a “nimble” and “lean and effective administration” which made change easy to 





C. Dr. Cooper’s Vision: 2000 Strategic Plan  
The 2000 Strategic Plan, begun on January 6, 1999 and formally approved by the Board 
of Trustees on May 12, 2000, serves as an effective indicator of Dr. Cooper’s vision for the 
University of Richmond.162 The introductory portion of the 2000 Strategic Plan was particularly 
indicative of Dr. Cooper’s overall approach to his presidency, stating that “Richmond’s strengths 
are exceeded only by its aspirations.”163 The plan had three core ingredients: “People, Programs 
and Resources.”164 The first element pertained to the recruitment and retention of the best 
possible students, faculty, and staff. The second element sought the development of innovative, 
cohesive programming designed to facilitate integration among Richmond’s diverse set of 
schools and departments and broadly create new interaction among students and faculty, through 
new research initiatives. The third element was chiefly financial, aiming to generate the 
resources to achieve the first two aims, build the necessary infrastructure for the implementation 
of new programs and further enrich the impressively picturesque exterior of the campus in order 
to inspire the creativity of all those working at or connected to the University.165 
  The 2000 Strategic Plan contained seventeen core objectives for the advancement of the 
University pertaining to “people” and “programming.” To narrow the scope of this section, since 
the 2000 Strategic Plan itself is a comprehensive 70-plus page document, I will describe the few 
initiatives which would be most closely associated with the funding from the tuition increase in 
2005. First, pertaining to “people,” the University sought to “recruit and retain a diverse 
community of the most creative, academically focused students.”166 This objective would be 
attained through several steps, most notably by “providing additional need-based aid to students 
from diverse backgrounds” and granting more “full-tuition scholarships to multitalented students 





listed the latter, reasoning “the most selective universities in the nation do not offer merit-based 
scholarships on the grounds that all students are meritorious” – a sign that this objective was a 
mere stepping stone towards future goals regarding academic quality and financial aid.168 
Additionally, the University aimed to pay its faculty higher salaries in order to attract more top-
quality professors. Also, it looked to expand its teaching force by up to 50 new members which 
would ultimately decrease the student-faculty ratio from roughly above 10:1 to 9:1.169 Much of 
the other programming improvements would be funded via different sources of revenue. The 
University had a main objective for each of its schools, including strengthening the arts program, 
diversifying and expanding the science departments, increasing the ranking of the Robins School 
of Business to number one by 2010, and developing an interdisciplinary Masters in Leadership 
Studies Program.170 Other academic initiatives such as the Richmond Quest, the Richmond 
Research Institute, and a post-doctorate fellowship program all needed specific endowments of 
varying degrees, funds which would come from separate revenue sources.  
Aside from “People” and “Programming,” in the development process of the 2000 
Strategic Plan, Dr. Cooper enlisted a Resources Task Force to determine how the University 
would fund its various initiatives. The Resources Task Force examined the University’s 
infrastructure needs and current revenue streams, determining that additional funding sources 
would come in the form of a capital campaign and special adjustments to undergraduate student 
fees.171 The capital campaign would aim to raise $215 million, the majority of the resources 
necessary to complete the objectives of the plan. However, the plan also noted that the 
university’s current pricing position in relation to its competitor schools would allow for 





looked to increase revenue from a variety of sources, providing the “fuel” necessary for 
achieving the university’s ambitious objectives.173 
The plan denoted three specific areas which would require the most financial resources: 
“merit-based scholarships and enhanced financial aid, additional faculty and staff, and new or 
renovated physical spaces.”174 The betterment of the financial aid program would require a $40 
million dollar endowment fund, $30 million allocated for an additional 60 merit-based aid 
scholarships and $10 million to solidify the comprehensive financial aid program of the 
University. At that time, the University met “at least 90% of aid for all eligible students” and 
“raising it to 100% would cost an additional $1.5 to $2 million per year.”175  Moreover, the 
University sought to fund 42 additional staff members, 45 more faculty members and 10-12 
endowed chair positions. Furthermore, the strategic plan put great emphasis on renovating and 
expanding the Gottwald Science Center, looking at other small, private, competitor schools 
which would “spend an average of $40 million each on science building projects.”176 A 
Boatwright Library renovation project was in order too, as well as additional classroom and 
office space and improvements to the Robins Center, costing a projected $85 million. Other 
ancillary projects required funding, but to a lesser degree. All in all, Dr. Cooper’s ambitious plan 
for the University of Richmond required substantial resources from a multitude of sources, the 
largest being the capital campaign, but the most notable, for the sake of this paper, being the 
resources drawn from possible increases in tuition and room and board charges.    
D. Build-up towards Major Tuition Increase 
Dr. Cooper, at the advent of his term in office, conceptualized that the University of 





fungible revenue dollars. He realized that the amount of revenue that ought to be generated could 
not be reached only through gradual “5 percent tuition increases from U of R’s already low 
tuition base.”177 At the time, the University of Richmond was definitely underpriced tuition-wise 
in relation to its competition. What’s more, room and board charges also were customarily 
underpriced, due to an enduring policy of “keeping room and board prices low so as to prevent 
students from moving off-campus in the event of a tuition hike.”178 Due to Richmond’s history of 
charging less than its competition in several realms, drawing additional revenue only from 
modest percentage increases in sticker-price would garner only modest returns. However, if the 
University were to enact a special, one-time tuition increase, raising the base price level, not only 
would Richmond’s price point in the higher education marketplace be elevated, but the 
University then would have tuition and room and board revenue streams more akin to its 
competitors. Simply put, the University of Richmond would have similar levels of tuition/room 
and board resources to use to enhance its academic quality and would no longer have to 
“compete with its hand tied behind its back” in the marketplace.179  
However, Dr. Cooper also assessed the culture of the University as one of “financial 
modesty,” alluding not to the lucrative history of giving or the large endowment, but rather 
speaking to the institution’s pride in its market position as a school offering “value” to its 
students, or in Dr. Cooper’s words, a “bargain.”180 The University had long priced itself beneath 
its peer and aspirant schools, thriving more so from its generous benefactors and substantial 
endowment returns. Therefore, despite an apparent need for a reassessment of its pricing policies 
due to the University’s expensive goals, Dr. Cooper astutely opted to focus more upon building 
resources for his strategic plan objectives via other sources of revenue like fundraising and rents 





modifications to the University’s pricing policy several years down the road. For instance, in 
2001, Dr. Cooper secured a 35-acre property, located in downtown Richmond, including a 250 
thousand square foot executive office building, formerly owned by the aluminum company 
Alcoa Inc. The University “gift-purchased” the $24 million property for $8 million, and to this 
day the property, currently leased by the tobacco company Altria Inc., still generates roughly $3 
million per year for the University.181 Fundraising efforts for the $215 million dollar capital 
campaign began immediately as well. Dr. Cooper employed a unique approach of having 
academic deans participate in the fundraising process – an appropriate and tangible expression of 
the relationship between academic quality and financial resources.182 Due to the early vigor with 
fundraising efforts, by the 2003-2004 academic year, the school had raised roughly $150 million 
already for the capital campaign.183   
Upon completion of the 2000 Strategic Plan, a minor special increase in tuition was set to 
be implemented for the 2001-02 academic year. The 2000 Plan projected a $1,400 special 
increase in tuition for first- and second-year students with adjusted financial aid awards “so that 
relative out-of-pocket expenses to needy students [would] not change.”184 This would result in a 
12 percent increase in tuition and a 10 percent increase in overall charges to students. The 
increase would be fully implemented by the 2004-05 year and produced $4.6 million in 
additional annual revenue upon full implementation. The special increase, in additional to the 
consistent yearly percentage increases, helped fund a full range of institutional improvements, 
including 20 new faculty hires, 25 staff positions, 40 new merit scholarships in order to satisfy 
the academic missions of the University. Also, for the time being, the increase in undergraduate 
fees allowed for the full implementation of need-blind admissions policy which met one hundred 





supported the achievement of a number of strategic plan objectives. Moreover, the University 
also increased room and board charges by 20.5 percent in 2000 to match the charges of its 
competitors.185 Room and board fees consistently increased by only four percent in the years 
following the initial increase of 20.5 percent.186 
By 2003, the University of Richmond was perpetually gaining momentum as an 
institution. Dr. Cooper and the University at-large had made great progress in attaining various 
strategic planning objectives. The most tangible expressions of that momentum were that 20 of 
the intended 45 new faculty lines had been acquired, 18 of the 43 intended new staff members 
had been hired, 12 major building projects were either undertaken or complete, 40 of the 60 new 
merit scholarships had been established, 28 new curricular programs had been introduced, and 
the financial aid policies of need-blind admissions and meeting 100 percent of demonstrated 
need had finally just been secured.187 SAT Scores of incoming students began to increase 
slightly, the middle 50 percent range improving from 1230-1360 in 2000 to 1240-1370 in 
2003.188 The student-faculty ratio had decreased from 10.7:1 to 9.4:1 in that same time-frame.189 
The acceptance rate had also dipped to 41 percent in 2003, down from 45 percent in 2000.190 
Diversity had improved slightly at the University as well, increasing by a percentage point from 
2000 to 2003 to a 12 percent minority population.191 The University was clearly making 
progress.  
Furthermore, significant advancement had occurred in obtaining new resources and 
building infrastructure as outlined in the 2000 Strategic Plan as well as the Campus Master Plan. 
The capital campaign was well over halfway in achieving its goal of raising $215 million. 
Improvements to infrastructure that directly supported the Plan’s vision of enabling students and 





$37 million renovation and expansion of the Gottwald Science Center, the building of Weinstein 
Hall, and planned enhancements to the Boatwright Library and the Robins Center, as well as the 
building of the Weinstein Recreation and Wellness Center during 2005-06. Many of the 
infrastructure and resource enhancements at that time had a direct and immediate impact on 
student learning and faculty recruitment. Library usage had increased 63 percent since the initial 
renovation to the Boatwright Library.192 Similarly, the amount of student research funding 
awarded by the University had increased by 32 percent and the number of students submitting 
research proposals had increased by 47 percent in just three years.193 Meaningful academic 
change was taking root at Richmond, contributing to the snowballing momentum of the 
institution. 
While all of these positive changes were happening, other forces were at work too 
regarding the future attainment of the strategic planning objectives. Around 2003, the university 
had essentially spent all that it could from its special $1,400 price increase in fully implementing 
the need-based admissions policies, adding faculty and staff, amongst other things. The 
university was looking to reassess its room and board pricing policy again at some point. Yet, 
after the initial 20.5 percent increase in 2000, Dr. Cooper questioned the meaningful effect of 
another substantial increase in those specific charges.194 The market had also just experienced 
two volatile years, resulting in the endowment receding below a billion dollars (the level eclipsed 
in 2001), dropping 11 percent in 2002 and stagnating at 0.5 percent in 2003.195 This called into 
question the permanence with which the university could keep spending in the same manner as 
the past three years, the focus being upon the new, more generous, need-based financial aid 





What’s more, as noted in previous sections, the federal government was beginning to 
scrutinize the financial practices of well-endowed colleges. Though Senators Charles Grassley 
and Max Baucus, the leaders of the Senate Finance Committee at the time, did not formally take 
a stand until 2008 when they wrote to the all U.S. colleges with endowments above $500 million 
asking questions about tuition levels, endowment growth and financial aid spending, 
governmental pressure was still evident to Dr. Cooper at least five years before the university 
received that letter.196 Due to augmented government scrutiny over universities' financials, it was 
becoming less clear just how legally feasible large tuition increases could be in the near future, 
never mind the customary public dissatisfaction which typically follows a tuition increase.  
Taking all of this into consideration, one can see how Dr. Cooper grasped how the 
necessary timing components were converging for a decision of this nature. The University of 
Richmond was making strides. It had just enacted a successful increase in undergraduate student 
fees, albeit minor in comparison to the increase Dr. Cooper had in mind, which led to substantial 
goal achievement by the institution. Dr. Cooper had proven an increase in price could work. At 
the same time, the University needed more resources to achieve its goals further. No benefactor 
similar to the Robins family was on the horizon to provide another $50 million dollar “Gift.”197 
The financial aid program needed more funding for long-term sustainability due to the recent 
market downtown. Faculty salaries had not yet been increased to a competitive level – a 
considerable expenditure for the University.198 Government pressures made the future feasibility 
of a decision even more uncertain. The situation was evolving into one which leaned favorably 
towards another special tuition increase discussion, one with a certain “now or never” undertone 






E. Action Steps towards the Tuition Increase 
 Dr. Cooper had made up his mind that the university needed an overhaul of its pricing 
policy when interviewing for the position of President.199 In 1997, he recognized the financial 
mismatch between the status quo pricing position and the university’s goals of becoming 
“Williams-plus.:200 Holding him back in his early years was the culture of financial modesty and 
certain timing constraints. In the year 2003, Dr. Cooper took action, sensing he had successfully 
made the case for an additional tuition increase via the school’s present accomplishments, and 
could further make the case if equipped with enough information about the true merits of another 
significant tuition increase. Therefore, he began to approach the relevant communication and 
decision-making channels through which this type of a decision must pass. If Dr. Cooper had a 
proposal for a special increase to undergraduate student fees, he would first consult his Vice 
President of Finance for further information on the best course of action. He would then propose 
the tuition increase to the Planning and Priorities Committee, who then, depending on the 
magnitude of tuition increase, may or may not enlist an ad hoc task force to research further the 
best course of action. Upon receiving the results of the task force, the Planning and Priorities 
Committee would then deliberate and vote upon the proposal, sending it to the Board of Trustees 
for formal approval. Once the proposal to increase tuition received formal approval from the 
Board, the proposal would be formally implemented.201  
Dr. Cooper’s first legitimate step towards this decision did not occur in the fall semester 
of 2003, but rather as soon as he was appointed as the University of Richmond’s president. He 
first sought to change the composition of the Board of Trustees, if necessary, in order to obtain 
the closest thing as possible to a “shared vision for the direction of the university.”202 The Board 





congruence in priorities between the Board and the President is imperative. This process led to 
the removal of the final four board members with ties to the Virginia Baptist Association, 
finalizing the trend that Dr. Heilman had started in 1971.203 Furthermore, Dr. Cooper also helped 
mobilize a governance task force for the Board of Trustees that “resulted in trustee term limits 
and other measures to raise accountability” for the Board.204 Even though initially certain board 
members were phased out at the conclusion of their terms to be replaced by individuals who 
aligned with the Dr. Cooper’s vision, no board members were replaced in order to gain support 
specifically for the tuition increase.205 By 2003, Dr. Cooper had already strategically designed a 
Board of Trustees in line with his high aspirations for his institution.  
In the fall of 2003, Dr. Cooper approached certain key decision-makers unofficially to 
discuss the university’s financial situation and its progress according to the 2000 Strategic Plan. 
Conversations about the need for additional revenues occurred frequently with numerous trustees 
and the President’s academic and administrative direct reports, including a number of deans.206 
Later that fall, Dr. Cooper then held “specific conversations about the tuition increase…with 
various trustee leaders, the CFO (Vice President of Finance Herb Petersen), and the Provost (Dr. 
June Aprille).”207 These conversations were valuable discussions regarding the necessity for and 
the feasibility of a significant tuition increase that would alter Richmond’s traditionally low 
pricing position. These talks also served as a means to gain initial support from the decision-
makers at the top end of the shared governance system; these individuals would have great 
influence, through the committees over which they presided and by the virtue of their positions, 
over individuals who also possessed integral decision-making power at the other end of the 
shared governance spectrum. By the end of the fall semester, Dr. Cooper had convinced these 





the VP of Finance Herb Petersen, the two settled upon three distinct pricing options to explore: 
$3,000, $5,000 and $7,000.  Regarding how he came up with the three options, Dr. Cooper 
revealed that he and Petersen knew that they probably needed the $7,000 option “to fully close 
the gap with leading competitors… [Still,] $3,000 represented the lowest increase that might still 
be worth the effort, and we wanted to give the task force room for serious deliberation.”208 After 
coming up with three potential pricing options, it was now time to begin to move this decision 
through the appropriate institutional decision-making channels.209 
F. Planning and Priorities Committee and Pricing Policy Task Force 
The Planning and Priorities Committee met three times during the fall of 2003, reviewing 
and discussing the university’s operating budget for the next academic year of 2004-05. One 
important agenda item discussed was the “significant and unanticipated downturn in the 
market.”210 As a result, the University of Richmond’s previous commitment to offer a need-blind 
admissions policy and 100 percent of demonstrated aid was in jeopardy. The committee decided 
at that point in time that a tuition increase of 6 percent for the next academic year could 
adequately provide the funds for the financial aid program.211  
During one of the later fall meetings, Dr. Cooper put forth the idea of exploring a special 
tuition increase. As a result, the next step was to create an ad hoc subcommittee, the Pricing 
Policy Task Force, composed of numerous members of administration, in order to investigate 
comprehensively the merits of each potential pricing increase.212 According to one member of 
the task force, the then Dean of Arts and Sciences, Dr. Andrew Newcomb, the task force was 
specifically charged with “examining unbiasedly the pros and cons of each option, not to provide 





commissioned was to create a sense of seriousness surrounding the potential decision. According 
to Dr. Cooper, “Many ideas are thrown around by university administrators. Once there is a task 
force commissioned, people know that this thing is for real.”214  The task force was to compile 
enough information for a formal report to be presented to the Planning and Priorities Committee 
during its spring meeting in April. Once presented, the decision would then move up the 
decision-making channels for further discussion in the fall of 2004.   
On April 19, 2004, the Pricing Policy Task Force presented their findings to Dr. Cooper 
and the Planning & Priorities Committee in the spring budgetary meeting. They presented their 
analysis of the three potential special tuition increases of $3,000, $5,000 and $7,000. First, they 
researched other similar tuition increases at certain competitor schools Northwestern, Wake 
Forest, Washington University in St. Louis and the University of Richmond in 2001-02. They 
found “significant positives” and “negligible negatives…if any, in admission statistics” in these 
four case studies.215 When examining other schools that increased tuition, they also found that, in 
line with the workings of higher education economics, a small downturn in admissions quality, 
selectivity and yield could occur in the immediate short-term.  
Next, the task force presented a formal list of pros and cons for each potential tuition 
increase option, the crux of their presentation. For the $3,000 option, the main benefit was an 
increase in gross tuition revenue of $9.2 million, with $4.8 million in financial aid obligations 
over four years, $4.4 for additional resources for strategic planning resources over four years, 
and 100% of the revenue generated in the first year being earmarked solely for financial aid. 
Other benefits included the maintenance of the university’s traditionally, competitively low 
pricing position, a lack of media attention, and a more easily explained tuition increase to the 





percent tuition increase, a possible but unlikely downturn in annual giving, an insufficiency in 
accumulating enough revenue for near-term aspirations in the current strategic plan and long-
term, future strategic planning endeavors, and a pricing position which did not reflect the 
university’s “true value compared to peer and aspirant schools.”216  
The $5,000 option presented even greater pros and cons. The main benefit was an 
increase in gross tuition revenue of $15.4 million over four years, with financial aid obligations 
of $7.2 million and a remaining $8.2 million for other strategic initiatives. Other benefits 
included remaining in the 50th percentile position in cost relative to peer and aspirant schools, 
positive media attention from the “strategic uses to which” [the] funds will be put,” and the 
provision of enough funding to finish the current strategic plan with a money left for further 
strategic initiatives or a “financial cushion” in the event of a market downtown or incorrect 
financial aid projections.217 The cons of the $5,000 option were: a reduction in competitive 
pricing position, a short-term increase in acceptance rate, higher need-based financial aid 
obligations, a reported increase of 20.7 percent and the negative media hype surrounding such an 
increase, a possible but unlikely downturn in annual giving, a deterrence in enrollment for 
middle class prospective student who “do not qualify for need-based aid and for whom cost is 
thus a factor,” and less funds for the development of the next strategic plan.218 
The $7,000 option provided both the greatest benefits and the largest potential negatives. 
The main benefit of the $7,000 option was the increase of $21.6 million in gross tuition over four 
years, with $9.8 million in financial aid obligations and $11.8 million remaining for other 
strategic plan purposes. Other benefits again included the potential for positive media attention 
surrounding the positive uses to which the funds would be directed, sufficient funds to complete 





advances [which] could be funded and…readily apparent and easily explainable…to all affected 
constituencies.”219 The most interesting benefit listed was “a $7,000 increase, which reflects our 
ambition, optimism and momentum, is very bold.”220 Many similar cons to the $5,000 option 
existed for the $7,000 option: the elimination of the pricing advantage in comparison to the 
university’s competitors, a negative impact on admissions due to an increase in acceptance rate 
and a reduction in yield, higher levels of need-based financial aid obligations, a reported tuition 
increase of 26.9 percent (not including the additional inflationary increase) and the potential for 
negative media hype, an unlikely effect on annual giving, and a deterrence for middle class 
enrollment.221  
In addition to the list of pros and cons, the Pricing Policy Task Force supplemented their 
report with various other appendices of information. They presented visuals of the university’s 
three potential pricing levels, for tuition alone and overall sticker-price, in relation to its 
competitor schools. Also, they presented the findings of a study by Christopher Avery and 
Caroline M. Hoxby titled Do and Should Financial Aid Packages Affect Students’ Choices. The 
study found numerous insights, including “students do not view loans and work study as 
significantly inferior to grants…an additional $1,000 in grants raises a student’s probability of 
matriculating by 11 percent of the prior probability…[and] an additional $1,000 in tuition lowers 
a student’s probability of matriculating of matriculating by 2 percent.”222 In essence, the study 
served to inform parties about the effects of increasing tuition and increasing financial aid 
packages on admissions yield.  
Furthermore, the task forth included a letter in their presentation from a University of 
Richmond professor of economics, Dr. James Monks, who examined the short-term effects of 





“In my opinion a $3000 bump in price still will maintain our cost advantage relative to 
most of our private peer institutions, and will have a negligible impact on our yield. A 
$7000 bump in price essentially eliminates this cost advantage and it is my gut feeling 
that an increase of this magnitude will have an appreciable impact on our yield. The 
middle bump of $5000, it is my sense, will be felt in terms of our yield, and thus 
represents a trade-off of yield versus revenue. There are actions we can take to buffer the 
yield from these effects, such as taking a larger share of the class through early decision, 
but this too represents a trade-off.”223  
Dr. Monks declared the economic fact that the potential increases in revenue from the tuition 
increase could be offset by a decrease in yield, increasing in degree with the magnitude of the 
tuition increases. Thus, depending on the degree of the tuition increase, the University must 
prepare for the implications of a downturn in admissions.  
Finally, the Pricing Policy Task Force addressed the idea of a university’s discount rate, 
the percentage of gross tuition revenue which funds total scholarships and grants.224 The discount 
rate essentially manifests the aggregate “mark-down” or “discount” that an institution grants to 
its students via financial aid. Discount rates can reflect several indicators of a school’s financial 
position. For instance, if a poorly-endowed school has a discount rate of 50 percent (half of its 
tuition revenue is devoted to grant and financial aid expenditures) as a means to reach an 
enrollment target, such is troublesome. That school is giving away money just to fill seats. On 
the other hand, a wealthy school can sustain a discount rate of over 50 percent in the pursuit of 
meeting full need-based aid, so long as they continue to offer competitive academic quality and 
have consistent student demand and tuition revenues. In 2002, the University of Richmond 





and tuition revenue. With each potential increase, the university would increase its discount rate 
to 37.7 percent, 38.1 percent, and 38.6 percent respectively – all positive figures due to the 
university’s wealth and net tuition projections.225 Regarding discount rates, any of the three 
options would put the university in a better standing in relation to its competitor schools.  
In April 2004, the Planning & Priorities Committee heard the presentation of the Pricing 
Policy Task Force, yet made no formal recommendation or decision, waiting until its first fall 
meeting to take a stance on a pricing policy. On the whole, several clear themes surfaced in the 
Pricing Policy Task Force’s report. First, it was clear that the task force too believed in the high 
aspirations of Dr. Cooper. The language of the report evidenced as much. For instance, a 
continual qualifying statement for certain cons listed surrounding the negative media attention 
was the potential for the public to recognize the beneficial and ambitious uses for which the 
additional revenues would be used.226 Also, one benefit listed for the $7,000 option was not a 
tangible fact, but rather an intangible message which the implementation of that option would 
convey about the university: boldness, ambition and optimism for the future. Second, the chief 
aims for the additional revenues from the increases in undergraduate student fees were made 
certain: diversity and academics. The proposed increases in funding were clearly being divided 
between enlarged need-based financial aid obligations and resources for current and future 
strategic planning objectives. Increasing need-based financial aid obligations has clear, positive 
implications for increasing diversity in admissions.227 Also, judging by the clear academic 
emphasis evident in Dr. Cooper’s then current strategic plan, one can safely assume that he 
planned to devote even more resources towards the improvement of the academic quality of the 






G. Summer and Fall 2004: Moving Along the Decision-Making Channels 
Over the summer months of 2004, Dr. Cooper directed his attention towards gaining 
support for the decision from the Board of Trustees. He clearly was in support of the $7,000 
option, as he had been since his appointment as President. Every week that summer Dr. Cooper 
arranged a luncheon with a different trustee, during which he would discuss the merits for and 
necessity of the tuition increase. By August he had the full support of the Board of Trustees for 
the special tuition increase of $7,000.228 These meetings were so crucial to the tuition increase 
decision. The luncheons were prudent and effective exhibitions of persuasion. The Board of 
Trustees was the final party in the decision-making sequence, and Dr. Cooper had secured 
confirmation that if the resolution were to come before them, it would pass. Such knowledge 
would give Dr. Cooper confidence in presenting the tuition increase to the other parties involved 
in the decision-making chain. He had already convinced his direct reports, especially the Provost 
and VP of Finance, who helped him develop the tuition increase proposal in the first place.  Only 
two more parties needed formal convincing: the Planning & Priorities Committee, which he 
presided over, and the University Faculty, which confirmed resolutions before they were sent to 
the Board of Trustees for approval.  
The Planning & Priorities Committee reconvened early in the fall semester of 2004, 
discussing again the report of the Pricing Policy Task Force. During the meeting, “Dr. Cooper 
fielded questions and requested input from committee members” regarding the special tuition 
increase.229 By the conclusion of the meeting, they had agreed upon the $7,000 option as best, 
with an additional 5 percent increase in undergraduate tuition (for returning students), 4 percent 
increase in compensation and 3 percent increase in operating budget.230 The decision was now 





2004. At the special faculty meeting, the first order of business was the findings of the Pricing 
Policy Task Force. The entire report was presented and “the President solicited faculty input on 
the report” which was to be proposed to the Board of Trustees on October 15, 2004.231 The 
discussion reportedly “revolved around the potential impact of the proposed tuition increase on 
the University’s efforts to recruit a more diverse student body.”232 Also, in response to concerns 
about admissions selectivity and yield, Dr. Cooper responded that “raising tuition would improve 
yield in the long run since the increase will fund improvements in academic programs. Tuition, 
as the largest source of the University’s income, unfairly limits our programs if it is priced too 
low in relation to other schools.”233 Following the discussion, most faculty members agreed with 
the merits of the special tuition increase and were on board. The proposal was set to move along 
to the Board of Trustees for formal approval.  
H. The Decision Itself 
On October 15, 2004, the special tuition increase proposal of $7,000 was proposed to, 
voted upon and approved by the Board of Trustees. The minutes from that meeting could not be 
retrieved, so there is no accessible record of any deliberation regarding the decision. The Board 
of Trustees voted to set the 2005-06 total price of attendance for entering first-year and transfer 
undergraduate students at $40,510, an increase of 26.9 percent, with 40 percent of the tuition 
revenue increase being used to continue to fund the policy of meeting 100 percent of 
demonstrated need.234 Furthermore, the Board approved only a 5 percent increase in tuition for 
returning undergraduate students, as well as a 4 percent increase in room and board charges for 
all students. Combining both increases to tuition and the room and board charges, the increase in 
sticker-price would be 31 percent. The proposal grandfathered the tuition increase only for 





transfer students would be agreeing to attend the university knowing its new, higher price and 
current undergraduates agreed to attend the university under different conditions.  
I. Steps Immediately Following the Decision 
 Following the approval of the tuition increase by the Board of Trustees, Dr. Cooper had 
to direct a unified public relations effort. Several other university constituencies had to be 
reached, namely alumni, students, the media and the local community. The public relations 
campaign attempted to convey the same message to all parties; no special attention was directed 
towards any of the constituencies.235 Dr. Cooper and other university officials, namely the 
Provost and the deans, emphasized the benefits and goals surrounding the tuition increase during 
the small-scale media campaign. One common metaphor used during the campaign was 
describing the university as a “rocket” which now had the “fuel source” to take off into orbit.236 
When describing the small scope of the media campaign, Dr. Cooper explained that “no 
university I can think of ever announces a major tuition increase without push-back, and the 
more you try to explain goals and benefits, the more you can anger those who do not share those 
goals…”237 Thus, the University’s message was relatively straightforward and succinct, 
strategically so. High-ranking university officials did receive training pertaining to the main 
talking points about the tuition increase.238 Also, the public campaign was conducted in a manner 
consistent with how other universities conduct media campaigns surrounding tuition increases.239  
 Internally, there was no real push-back regarding the decision with the constituencies 
involved in the decision-making process. Most parties knew the great potential behind the 
additional revenue sources. The $21.6 million in annual revenue was the equivalent of a payout 
from an endowment of $432 million, and that alone galvanized support from most administrators 





decision, from the local media, the Richmond community and the campus community, all which 
was expected.  Countless local news sources covered the story, and the university did receive 
some national attention for the tuition increase. Some Richmond alumni expressed their 
dissatisfaction, claiming that the Richmond identity that they had grown fond of was changing 
for the worse.241 Certain community members expressed concern that they could no longer afford 
to send their kids to such an expensive university.242 Ken Kraper, the then student Vice President 
of the Richmond College Student Government Association, showed concern regarding the 
middle-class members of the Richmond community. He claimed that “a lot of that middle class 
that defines Richmond right now will get wiped out… A lot of people think it will just be the 
rich kids paying for the poor kids.”243 However, the university was aware of the concerns that 
would be raised around the tuition decision. The plan was to conduct the appropriate public 
relations campaign outlining the goals and benefits to all constituents of the university, then 
weather the storm in the short-run and make certain to achieve a greater level of academic 
excellence which would ultimately quiet the critics in the long-run.  
 The downturn in admissions statistics was palpable as well, also as expected. 
Immediately following the decision, Dr. Cooper reported during the university faculty in January 
2005 that “the number of early decision applicants [were] somewhat lower” than the last year at 
that point in time. He also reported that “proactive communications with students, faculty, staff, 
alumni and families of those in the inquiry pool had been very effective in putting the tuition 
increase in a positive light.”244 However, in the academic year 2005-06, overall applications had 
dipped by 8 percent, falling from 6,236 applicants in 2004 to 5,778 applicants in 2005.245 
Admissions selectivity increased to 48 percent in 2005, rising nine points from its low level of 39 





percent in 2005. Diversity also stagnated in the short-term; the university admitted a minority 
population of 12 percent, the same figure as in 2004. Additionally, admitted student quality 
dipped only slightly, the middle 50 percent range dropping from 1260-1380 in 2004 to 1250-
1370 in 2005.247 All in all, the University had prepared for the worst, expecting a potential 
decrease in applications as large as 25 percent.248 Dr. Cooper expressed the fact that he was 
“pleased” to see the eight percent decrease in applications in 2005.249 
 Finally, the meaningful scope of this narrative does not extend much past the 2005-06 
academic year, for Dr. Cooper’s presidency became clouded at that time by a controversy 
external from the decision-making process of the tuition increase as well as the public 
information campaign following the tuition increase. As a result, Dr. Cooper’s narrative ends 
when he left the University in 2007. One must note that Dr. Cooper left the University 
Presidency in 2007. Yet, though his direct influence over the University may have ended, the 
policy to increase undergraduate student fees still remained and many of the benefits and other 
consequences of such policy came into effect during his successor Dr. Edward Ayers’ tenure. 
Therefore, though the narrative ends in 2007, the range of the appraisal of the effects of Dr. 










Chapter Three: The Appraisal of Dr. Cooper’s Leadership  
Good leadership can be evaluated in a multitude of ways.  Sometimes we aim to evaluate 
leaders on how effectively they implement their vision and attain group goals. A good leader then 
is one who gets things done. Other times we look to evaluate leaders on how ethically they act in 
certain situations, whether they do what they ought to do according to some set of moral 
expectations. A good leader then is one who does the right things in the right way. Ideally we 
want our leaders to be as ethical and effective as possible. Often though, evaluating good 
leadership involves much more complex analysis. In some situations, a leader can act ethically 
only by acting effectively, by serving the groups’ interests and goals above all else. Yet, in other 
situations, a leader can act effectively but entirely unethically, exemplifying the well-known 
Machiavellian phrase, the ends justify the means. In my evaluation of Dr. Cooper’s leadership, I 
intend to evaluate both ethics and effectiveness within the special university context. With 
respect to Dr. Cooper’s decision to increase the price of tuition, I will gradually expand the scope 
of my appraisal, starting first with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the specific actions of Dr. 
Cooper himself. From there, I will answer the questions of whether Dr. Cooper was a good 
leader, ethically and effectively, within the University of Richmond setting, within the 
marketplace of higher education, and within the broad context of society. 
John W. Chandler, former president of Williams College and Hamilton College, and G. 
Donald Chandler, III, a professor of Leadership Studies at Williams College and a Director 
Emeritus of McKinsey & Co., Inc., outline a full concept of leadership effectiveness in their joint 
work, On Effective Leadership: Across Domains, Cultures, and Eras.250 The authors make the 
distinction between the ideas of “effective leadership” and “exceptional leadership.” They claim 





successfully achieves the mutual purpose shared by the leader and his followers…who were won 
and motivated primarily through the leader’s exercise of persuasion.”251 Exceptional leadership, 
on the other hand, can be neither “immoral in means or ends… [it] is the combination of the 
leader’s effectiveness and the worthiness of the goal achieved.”252 After this initial distinction, 
they provide s four-part framework of effective leadership, consisting of first developing a 
compelling and shared vision for goal-achievement, then communicating the vision to one’s 
constituency persuasively, and finally building an organizational construct that “supports the 
implementation of the vision, ensures ongoing alignment between leader and followers, and 
institutionalizes the vision even after the leader is gone.”253 I aim to steer clear from the fourth 
part of their theory, selflessness, in my evaluation. Even though their theory of leadership 
effectiveness is concerned with leadership “as a set of activities,” they also note that personal 
traits and behaviors are not to be ignored for “they may help a leader gain initial credibility with 
a group and enhance the probability of his or her leadership success.”254  
On the whole, Chandler and Chandler lay out extremely useful criteria for evaluating Dr. 
Cooper’s overall leadership effectiveness. The distinction between effective and exceptional 
leadership allows us to look solely at goal achievement and make appraisals of the manner in 
which goals were attained as well as the moral value of the goals themselves. Drawing from 
relevant leadership theories, in the first section I will evaluate the manner in which Dr. Cooper 
initially gained the legitimacy and credibility necessary in order to make his decision to increase 
the University’s tuition. Next, I will evaluate Dr. Cooper’s vision for the University and the 
degree to which his decision fit in with his intended direction for the University. Afterwards I 
will evaluate the effectiveness of Dr. Cooper’s uses of persuasion in gaining the requisite support 





in order to implement his vision. The benefit of Chandler and Chandler’s third element is the fact 
that it states the “[institutionalization] of the vision even after the leader is gone,” which opens 
the evaluation to the institution’s advancement after the end of Dr. Cooper’s presidency up to the 
current position of the University of Richmond in the higher education marketplace.255 
I. Effective Leadership 
A. Leader Legitimacy  
A precondition of leadership effectiveness which we must examine is the manner in 
which Dr. Cooper acquired legitimacy from his followers. Dr. Edwin Hollander, Emeritus 
Distinguished Professor of Psychology at Baruch College, City University of New York, in his 
article “Legitimacy, Power and Influence: A Perspective on Relational Features of Leadership” 
(1993) forthrightly claims, “Leadership is not something a leader possesses so much as a process 
involving followership. Without followers, there plainly are no leaders or leadership.”256 David 
Messick, Professor Emeritus of Management & Organizations at Northwestern University’s 
Kellogg School of Management echoes a similar sentiment in his article, “On the Psychological 
Exchange Between Leaders and Followers” (2005). He describes the phenomenon of leadership 
as occurring not due to the personal qualities of leaders or the skill sets of leaders, but rather 
through the relationship built between leaders and followers.257 He examines the phenomenon as 
a leader-follower exchange, in which “leaders and followers provide support and gratifications 
for each other.”258 Taking into account the short distance between a university president and his 
constituents in the traditional system of university governance, followers play a large role in the 
leadership of a university president. In a university community, fostering a firm leader-follower 





Hollander further describes the role of followers in the leadership process, claiming, “Not 
only is it the follower who accepts or rejects leadership, but it is the follower who perceives both 
the leader and the situation and reacts in terms of what he perceives.”259 Hollander makes very 
clear the importance of gaining credibility with one’s followers. Messick also examines the 
question of why followers let themselves be led, stating that “followers follow because they get 
something from being followers…leaders provide some value that benefits followers. Followers 
respond in ways that benefit the leader. Thus, leaders and followers become linked in a mutually 
beneficial relationship through the exchange of benefits.”260 In order to make any institutional 
progress, especially in making such a bold decision, Dr. Cooper first had to galvanize his base of 
followers in order to receive the legitimacy to innovate by means of a tuition increase. Gaining 
status among followers precedes even the development of a vision for the institution, though 
there may be some interplay between the two in the onset of leadership. Also, part of a leader’s 
legitimacy stems from his followers’ perceptions that he could offer or generate some potential 
value on an individual and/or institutional basis. 
Dr. Cooper brought superlative academic and administrative credentials with him to the 
University of Richmond, having previously served as Executive Vice President for the Main 
Campus at Georgetown University. He also held faculty positions at Harvard University, 
the University of Iowa, and Tulane University, where he served as Dean of the Faculty of Liberal 
Arts and Sciences.261 He was both an accomplished academic and a seasoned administrator, 
which initially contributed to his status among both tiers of the university hierarchy, the faculty 
and the administration. The Board of Trustees already was swayed by his credentials, for they 
appointed him as president. Dr. Cooper’s prior credentials therefore granted him a certain 





psychological concept of idiosyncrasy credit (IC), which outlines the latitude in decision-making 
granted to a leader by his followers. In Hollander’s IC model, leadership is viewed “as a dynamic 
process of interpersonal evaluation in which credits are earned in the eyes of the follower.”263 If 
a leader desires to innovate effectively, he must first earn the necessary credits from his group, 
credits mostly earned through sheer competence and conformity to group norms.264 In addition, 
Hollander asserts that “derivative credits” may be earned, though to a lesser degree, via past 
experience, seniority, socioeconomic status, etc., which contribute to a leader’s legitimacy within 
the group and the license granted to innovate.265 Therefore, Dr. Cooper’s exemplary work prior 
to his presidency is a definitive example of a leader’s earning initial derivative credit. 
Though his previous academic record may have had an effect on some students, Dr. 
Cooper also attempted to build his status with the student body via hosting several public 
question and answer forums in which students could address the President directly.266 Since “the 
involvement of followers has to be recognized as a key component of effective leadership,” 
granting students numerous opportunities to give their perspective on the campus community and 
potentially have a hand in the development of the official direction for the university was a sound 
way to build legitimacy with that constituency.267 In addition, simply holding the office of 
President grants a certain level of legitimacy to an individual at least at first, before credit is 
subsequently accrued or withdrawn by followers over time.268 It can be said then, at the 
beginning of his presidency, that Dr. Cooper gained legitimacy with his group, the constituencies 
of the University of Richmond community, by means of derivative credits, the initial 
involvement of followers, and by virtue of his position. So far, I have outlined how Dr. Cooper 
himself gained legitimacy and credibility with his constituencies. However, this is an evaluation 





president. Therefore, what is more integral to this evaluation is not the manner in which Dr. 
Cooper gained legitimacy for himself, but rather how he legitimized his decision itself. His 
perceived legitimacy by his group is merely a portion of his overall effectiveness in generating 
legitimacy for the decision to increase the tuition of his institution by such a large amount. It 
cannot be denied, though, that he began with a certain amount of derivative credits at his 
disposal. 
B. A Compelling, Well-Conceived Vision Shared By Followers 
i. Gardner’s Leading Minds and Dr. Cooper’s Vision for the University  
Per the framework of Chandler and Chandler, the first major element of effective 
leadership is “developing a compelling, well-conceived vision for the achievement of a set of 
goals that are shared, or have the potential to be shared, by a group of followers.”269 Howard 
Gardner, in his book Leading Minds, sheds further light on this concept, stating, “Leaders 
achieve their effectiveness chiefly through the stories they relate,” the word “relate” referring to 
the many modes of communication which leaders employ.270 He later claims that an “ordinary 
leader…simply relates the traditional story of his or her group as effectively as possible,” 
whereas an “innovative leader takes a story that has been latent…among the members of his or 
her chosen domain, and brings new attention or a fresh twist to that story.”271 Gardner, too, notes 
the integral and potentially challenging role which a leader’s followers play, declaring, “By and 
large, members of a society are not…searching for an unfamiliar story or a new form of 
understanding.”272 In fact, he asserts that “the stories of the leader…must compete with many 
other extant stories; and if the new stories are to succeed, they must…in some measure outweigh 
the earlier stories, as well as contemporary ‘counterstories.’”273 Hence, according to Gardner, the 





“fresh twist,” to one’s followers, accounting for competing stories or “counterstories,” in a 
manner which translates ultimately into the group’s progress and attainment of goals. 
What exactly was Dr. Cooper’s story and how did he relate his story effectively? These 
two questions are central to the entire evaluation of Dr. Cooper’s leadership effectiveness. Dr. 
Cooper’s foremost story, his distinct vision for the University of Richmond, clearly was “to 
become the best, small, private, liberal arts University in the nation.”274 Such a story was not 
unfamiliar to the University of Richmond community either. Dr. Bruce Heilman communicated a 
similar story during his tenure as president. His story communicated his lofty goals for the 
University and the financial realities of higher education which necessitated heavy fundraising 
efforts, large capital campaigns, and several tuition hikes.275 His story included an element of 
prestige, involving crafting the image of the University as one with competitive levels of wealth, 
heightened academic quality and an augmented beautification of the campus exterior.276 Dr. 
Richard Morrill too communicated a similar narrative of striving to become the best, small, 
private, liberal arts university in the nation. His story assumed various strategic motifs, seen by 
his in-depth and comprehensive strategic plan and his precise and deliberate steps to unite the 
academic and administrative decision-making realms into a more nimble, fluid and efficient 
system of university governance. Additionally, his story consisted of maximizing academic 
quality via a maximization of financial resources, while at the same time maintaining the 
University’s niche position in the market as a “best-value” institution.277  
As a result, considering Hollander’s theory of legitimacy and Gardner’s theory of relating 
stories, Dr. Cooper’s narrative had to contain pertinent elements of the University identity 
already fastened by his predecessors in order to cultivate a sense a familiarity with the University 





some degree if he ever intended to innovate in any meaningful fashion. Dr. Cooper did 
immediately recognize the identity of the University of Richmond. He stated immediately his 
intention for the University to become the best, small, private, liberal arts school in the nation, a 
familiar message from a Richmond President to the Richmond community. He aimed to build 
upon the progress of his predecessors in academic quality, national reputation, financial aid, 
diversity, admissions selectivity, and campus quality, among many other things. But, upon his 
appointment, he was charged by the Board of Trustees with the goal of developing the University 
into a “Williams-plus” or a “Swarthmore-plus” institution, schools which were the best, small, 
private schools in the nation 278. Therefore, Dr. Cooper sought to make the University of 
Richmond the best of its kind, not just the “best university between Broad Street and the 
Westham Parkway” as some university constituents believed in the late 1990’s.279  
Consequently, Dr. Cooper conducted an assessment of what those schools were doing in 
relation to the University of Richmond at the time. He concluded that the University would have 
to deviate from its status quo in order to achieve further progress (becoming a Williams or a 
Swarthmore) while retaining the specific five-school, liberal arts identity of the University of 
Richmond (a Williams-plus or a Swarthmore-plus). Dr. Cooper’s story would thus offer a “fresh 
twist” to the existing stories within the University of Richmond setting. He identified that 
Richmond, in its current position as an underpriced, best-value institute, was competing 
financially in the higher education marketplace with “one hand tied behind its back.”280 But, 
changing Richmond’s enduring culture of financial modesty would most certainly be a 
nonconforming decision, one which would require definite legitimization over time. Dr. Cooper 
would develop the necessary credibility for this decision by developing a well-conceived and 





in order to gain credits from his followers by achieving numerous objectives of the Strategic 
Plan, and by eventually putting forth yet another compelling story firmly grounded in the 
economic workings of the higher education marketplace.  
ii. Developing a Shared Institutional Vision: The 2000 Strategic Plan 
Dr. Cooper’s ambitious vision for the University of Richmond was clear. Yet, translating 
such into an institutional vision, moving all parties of university governance and the campus 
community in the same direction in an integrative and cohesive manner, took a great deal of 
work. Dr. Morrill, in his work Strategic Leadership, writes about the integrative potential of 
strategic planning processes, claiming “[strategic plans] have to connect with the values, 
narratives and possibilities of a place in order to be authentic and motivating.281 But, Dr. Morrill 
also comments on “the ability of a strategy to create a shared sense of the future that motivates a 
community to make commitments, set priorities, and take actions” – therefore, if Dr. Cooper 
achieved the former, the latter would result.282 After only a year and a half as the President of the 
University of Richmond, Dr. Cooper had a formal strategic plan approved by the Board of 
Trustees with 17 principal objectives under the umbrella of the three core focus areas of People, 
Programming and Resources. The planning process involved all tiers of the University hierarchy 
including administrators, faculty members, and students as well as certain task forces composed 
of members from all three of those constituencies.  The final product did reflect the values and 
narratives of the University, as seen by the 2000 Strategic Plan’s stated mission: “We are 
committed to preserving our core values and adapting to conditions that affect all institutions of 
higher education. Our approach will be to increase diversity and build on the interactive and 
personalized learning environment that is recognized by students and alumni as the measure of 





“compelling and well-conceived vision,” but one which had a “shared” aspect among the 
relevant constituents in the Richmond community, and one which reflected the past and current 
identity of the institution. .   
Additionally, the 2000 Strategic Plan also declared, “Building on a rich tradition, this 
plan will enhance our ability to provide even greater opportunities for our students…and achieve 
a level of resources that allows us to build a sustaining engine of excellence.”284 One can see 
how Dr. Cooper implicitly began to make his case for a large tuition increase, the next layer of 
his overall story of becoming a “Williams-plus” university. Within this developed and shared 
vision for the university, the Richmond community generally agreed that the University needed 
to enhance its resources to some degree. Also, the fourth section of the 2000 Strategic Plan, titled 
“Resources and Infrastructure” explicitly states that, in order to improve the financial position of 
the University for the sake of achieving Strategic Planning objectives, “special adjustments to 
undergraduate student fees” were necessary. Furthermore, the 2000 Strategic Plan made 
definitively clear that the University of Richmond was dead set on achieving its shared goals, as 
evidenced by its final chapter titled “Spiraling Upward” which claimed that the University’s 
“strengths are only exceeded by [its] aspirations” and “as resources grow and fuel ideas for better 
programs, strategies for recruitment and development will add new possibilities to the mix.”285 
The positioning of the sections themselves in the Strategic Plan was highly effective. If the 
Richmond community agreed first upon the strategic vision and goals of the University in People 
and Programming, then they would be more inclined to agree upon the financial means to 
achieve those goals. Besides that, Dr. Cooper also was able to compel the University community 
to agree upon the fact that special alterations needed to be made to undergraduate fees for the 





Taking all of this into consideration, the 2000 Strategic Plan was subtly a masterful 
achievement on the part of Dr. Cooper. He established a sense of unity by choosing the familiar 
overarching theme, articulated by his predecessors and the Board of Trustees, of striving to 
become the best, small, private university in the nation. The Strategic Planning process, 
according to Dr. Morrill’s theory of strategic leadership, is essential in developing an integrative 
and shared vision for the institution as whole. What’s more, the 2000 Strategic Plan also 
displayed elements of Dr. Cooper’s own story and successfully laid the foundation for future 
innovation in the realm of the University’s financial position and, in turn, its institutional 
identity.  
C. Persuasively Communicating the Vision in a Manner Appropriate to the Group  
Revisiting the framework of Chandler and Chandler, the next element of effective 
leadership is “persuasively communicating the vision in a manner appropriate to the group.”286  
Once the institution formally began to implement its Strategic Plan in 2000, a vision which 
exhibited a certain level of conformity to the University of Richmond’s core values and 
narratives but still left sufficient leeway for potential institutional innovation, Dr. Cooper knew 
he must act swiftly in order to prove his case for an eventual increase in tuition. Using Gardner’s 
concept, Dr. Cooper had now put forth his initial story to his audience. But, in order for the 
members of the institution to internalize his comprehensive story, the story now had to be retold 
perpetually. In order to explicate this point, Gardner uses a quote from Richard Nixon, who said, 
“About the time you are writing a line you have written so often that you want to throw up, that 
is the time the American people will hear it.”287 Therefore, the topic of persuasion now becomes 
relevant to this discussion. In the realm of communication, Gardner also asserts that there are 





which Gardner describes: 1) the direct telling of the story by the leader to his audience, and 2) 
the embodiment of the story through the leader’s actions.288 I will focus on the latter first in this 
section, for Dr. Cooper’s persuasive actions and embodiment that truly legitimized his decision 
to increase Richmond’s tuition occurred chronologically before his explicit, persuasive narrative 
on behalf of the decision.   
i. Embodying the Story Through Competence and Conformity 
Dr. Cooper, through his own personal vision, his many speeches and conversations with 
the Richmond community, and the formal approval of the 2000 Strategic Plan, was now telling a 
forward-looking story of ambition and high institutional achievement. The many strengths of his 
institution were only outweighed by its lofty aspirations, and its chief aspiration was to become 
the best school of its kind in the nation. If Cooper were to successfully communicate this 
narrative of high-achievement, he of course had to embody this story and actually achieve these 
various institutional goals. One can see parallels in this situation between Gardner’s idea of 
embodying a narrative and Hollander’s notion of Idiosyncrasy Credit. Dr. Cooper had to earn 
credits from his followers and be willing to use ones he had been accorded earlier, via displays of 
competence. There were two clear instances in which he displayed sheer competence which 
contributed to his earning the credits necessary to ultimately make his decision in 2004-05.  
First, as outlined in the previous chapter, Dr. Cooper, per one of the Strategic Plan 
objectives, implemented a special 12 percent increase in tuition and a 10 percent increase in 
overall charges for the 2001-02 academic year.289 Upon full implementation, this increase in 
student charges produced $4.6 million in additional annual revenue. This increase in annual 





led to the full execution of need-blind admissions policy which met one hundred percent of 
demonstrated need – all shared goals of the institution.290 In short, this tuition increase worked. 
With more annual revenue, the academic quality of the institution tangibly improved as did the 
overall affordability of the institution following the comprehensive, need-blind financial aid 
policy. Therefore, when later putting forth the case for the even larger increase in undergraduate 
student fees, Dr. Cooper could point to the positive effect which a tuition increase already had 
upon the University of Richmond. Better yet, Dr. Cooper could point to the fact that more annual 
revenue led to a completion of shared, institutional goals.  
Also, including the effects of the first tuition increase, by the academic year of 2003-04, 
the University had already completed 11 of its 17 strategic plan objectives.291 In just three years, 
20 of the intended 45 new faculty had been hired, 18 of the 43 intended new staff members had 
been acquired, 12 major building projects were underway or completed, 40 of the 60 new merit 
scholarships had been established, 28 new curricular programs had been introduced, and the 
financial aid policies of need-blind admissions and meeting 100 percent of demonstrated need 
had finally just been secured.292 SAT Scores of incoming students began to increase slightly, the 
student-faculty ratio had decreased from roughly 11:1 to 9.5:1 and the acceptance rate had also 
dipped to 41 percent.293 Diversity had also improved slightly at the university as well increasing 
to a 12 percent minority population on campus.294 Many other academic programs were either 
started or bettered according to plan, and the capital campaign had already raised roughly 150 
million of the intended 215 million by 2004.295 Clearly progress was being made at an 
impressive rate.  
In just three years, Dr. Cooper effectively ushered in a moderate, special tuition increase 





from the new tuition increase and the capital campaign, Dr. Cooper displayed leadership 
competence in effectively accomplishing many of the shared goals of the University in a 
remarkably short period of time. Yet, all of this was attained while still conforming generally to 
the embedded university culture of financial modesty. Dr. Cooper also exhibited adherence in 
another manner, by not deviating to any degree from the 2000 Strategic Plan agreed upon by the 
Richmond community. Following Hollander’s theory, Dr. Cooper adequately prepared himself 
for an innovative, nonconforming decision by displaying competence through substantial goal-
achievement and by broadly conforming to the University culture and the University’s agreed-
upon plan. He had successfully shown his followers the clear benefits for the institution from an 
increase in revenue by means of increasing undergraduate student fees. Ultimately, he embodied 
his story of ambition and high-achievement and earned enough credits from his followers to 
finally put forth a “fresh twist” to his narrative, something along the lines of: “If such goals could 
accomplished by a modest special increase to an already lower-than-average price level, imagine 
what the University of Richmond could achieve if our undergraduate student charges (and tuition 
revenues) resembled that of our competitors.” 
ii. Relating the Narrative: Verbal Communication 
In order to successfully relate the “fresh twist” to his leadership narrative, the familiar 
story of high ambition and great institutional progress fused with a new tale of changing 
university culture and an augmentation of the University of Richmond’s academic and financial 
positions, Dr. Cooper needed to effectively persuade each University constituency of the true 
merits of his decision. Key to Chandler and Chandler’s second element of effective leadership is 
persuasion “in a manner appropriate to the group.”296 Therefore, Dr. Cooper had to be cognizant 





administrators may eagerly welcome more revenue in the form of undergraduate student fees in 
order to offer better quality academic programs, prospective students, parents of current students 
and alumni may skeptically scrutinize such a decision. He had to offer a narrative superior to that 
of the existing stories of the university’s historical culture and the potential “counterstories” 
which were bound to emerge from those in opposition to Dr. Cooper’s vision. Regardless, in 
order to effectively implement the decision, Dr. Cooper had to effectively persuade his followers 
that raising tuition by 31 percent was the best course of action for the University.  
a. Peripheral and Central Persuasion 
In this section, I will evaluate the effectiveness of Dr. Cooper’s persuasion in influencing 
his constituencies to implement and accept the decision to increase the tuition of the University 
by such a staggering amount. First, Dr. Cooper had to persuade the parties directly involved in 
the decision-making process on the merits of decision in order to garner their support and move 
the decision through the requisite channels of the strategic governance system. Next, Dr. Cooper 
had to convey the merits of the decision to the parties external to the decision-making process. 
As a means of evaluating the effectiveness of his persuasion, I will draw from the theories of 
James M. Olson and Graeme A. Haynes in their article, “Leadership and Persuasion” (2008)297 
Many individuals conceptualize persuasion simply as changing the attitudes or beliefs of 
another individual through an astute and convincing message.298 While this is true, persuasion 
can occur in another manner which is not “rational or argument-based,” but rather through “cues 
and features that imply that [the] position is correct.”299 Olson and Haynes describe these two 
types of persuasion as happening either through a central route, via information and strong 





can have a strong effect on certain individuals independently, but they can work in tandem 
effectively to change attitudes and beliefs. Olson and Haynes also contend that persuasion via the 
central route requires more effort, is used when the issue is highly important to the audience, and 
provides the longest-lasting effect on behavior and attitudes, whereas taking the peripheral route 
mandates less effort, is used for messages of less import, and is less effective over the long-
term.301  
Additionally, Gardner in Leading Minds implicitly alludes to Olson and Haynes’s two 
routes of persuasion when speaking about the difficulties a leader may face in relating his 
narrative to his audience. He asserts the challenge of putting forth a narrative grounded in reason 
and sound argumentation via the central route of persuasion, claiming: 
“Throughout life, individuals hear stories and have to evaluate their merits consciously 
and unconsciously. There is always the chance that a more sophisticated story will 
prevail, particularly when the teller is skilled and the audience is sophisticated. However, 
my study provides abundant evidence that, more often than not, the less sophisticated 
story remains entrenched – the unschooled mind triumphs.”302 
Again, Dr. Cooper not only had to choose carefully the appropriate manner in which he related 
his story to his followers, but he had to identify correctly the viewpoints of his various audiences 
and the varying degrees to which each one would be inclined to accept the changes that he was 
proposing.    
b. Employing Persuasive Communication: Targeting Each Constituency 
The narrative that Dr. Cooper crafted was relatively straightforward. For the University 





achieve its lofty goals and aspirations agreed upon in the 2000 Strategic Plan, it needed to 
increase its undergraduate student fees to the level of its competitors, for the sake of increasing 
the university’s total revenues. The University, in the years leading up to 2004-05, was 
“competing with one hand tied behind its back” in the marketplace. Dr. Cooper, as a college 
president, wanted to better the University’s quality of education and strengthen the sustainability 
of its financial position. Simply put, the University needed “fuel for the rocket” to reach its new, 
intended heights.303 
Grounding his narrative in a firm grasp of the economics of higher education, he made 
the case for the benefits that additional revenues had already brought and could bring to the 
University. He knew that the main metric of determining a university’s position in the economic 
hierarchy was wealth. In order to better the academic product, a university needs to secure and 
build upon its wealth. The University of Richmond at the time was well-off endowment-wise and 
the likelihood of another donor akin to E. Claiborne Robins emerging in the near future was slim. 
Dr. Cooper then saw the only real potential to increase his institution’s wealth via tuition 
revenue. From that revenue, he could actualize his ambition for the University; he could lure 
better faculty, build better facilities and better the University’s academic programs and other 
campus offerings. He could increase the overall level of expenditures per student. As the 
reputation would grow from such, more students and better students would desire to attend 
Richmond and the University could then tighten admissions selectivity, admitting the best 
quality students possible, furthering the institution’s academic quality. Dr. Cooper also knew that 
greater levels of wealth could make the University more affordable for more individuals through 
a comprehensive, need-based financial aid program that met all demonstrated need. As a result, 





quality academic product. Generally speaking, his narrative surrounding the potential tuition 
increase conveyed the many likely beneficial outcomes from greater institutional incomes. He 
communicated messages of high ambition, enhanced reputation and competitiveness, increased 
affordability for a wider spectrum of prospective students, stronger academics, greater 
selectivity, and overall, better educated and well-rounded Richmond students.304  
1. Pricing Policy Task Force 
The extent to which and the manner in which Dr. Cooper communicated this overall 
message varied from constituency to constituency. Before examining the groups which Dr. 
Cooper had to persuade overtly, it will help to address an essential group in the internal decision-
making which aided greatly in the development of Dr. Cooper’s persuasive narrative, the Pricing 
Policy Task Force. The Pricing Policy Task Force provided the basis for many of his persuasive 
arguments to the other groups. The Pricing Policy Task Force was tasked by Dr. Cooper to 
analyze objectively the three proposed increases in tuition, the $3,000, $5,000 and $7,000 
options, without making a formal recommendation. The Task Force presented an arsenal of 
information to Dr. Cooper with which he could propose well-grounded, effective arguments via a 
central route of persuasion. He then knew for certain the wide-ranging pros and cons of the three 
proposed courses of action.  
As a result, by thoroughly examining all three proposals, the Pricing Policy Task Force 
helped Dr. Cooper’s solidify message supporting the $7,000 special tuition increase. Olson and 
Haynes, in their article “Persuasion and Leadership” speak about certain characteristics of a 
message which enhance its persuasiveness, pointing to the effectiveness of a two-sided message 
in comparison to a one-sided message.305 They presume that a “two-sided message that refutes 





arguments for the opposing side are weak.”306 Dr. Cooper could use the findings of the Pricing 
Policy Task Force to assert the benefits of the $7,000 tuition increase were superior to its 
alternatives. Furthermore, the report of the Task Force helped to unearth certain “counterstories” 
which could emerge in opposition to each proposed course of action. For instance, in their report 
they claim that a shared downside of the $5,000 or the $7,000 tuition increase was “Given the 
current media hype surrounding tuition increases nationally, increasing our price could result in 
negative press for Richmond.”307  In a similar vein, equipped with the findings of the Pricing 
Policy Task Force, Dr. Cooper could articulate the specific benefits of a proposed tuition 
increase to further his message and refute the messages of those in opposition. As a result of 
enlisting the Pricing Policy Task Force to assess thoroughly his three proposed tuition increase, 
Dr. Cooper not only had the requisite means to use a central route of persuasion through well-
informed argumentation, but he could also develop an effective two-sided message refuting those 
in opposition to his specific tuition increase of $7,000 or a tuition increase in general.  
2. Planning & Priorities Committee 
 The first essential party in the decision-making system of university governance is the 
Planning & Priorities Committee, chaired by the President, and comprised of administrators, 
including the vice presidents and academic deans, as well as several faculty members from the 
University’s schools of Arts and Sciences, Business, Law and Leadership Studies.308 The 
committee focuses on strategic planning, assists in shaping institutional priorities and allocating 
resources, and makes annual recommendations regarding the budget.309 As one can infer, P&P 
Committee members are well-versed in the institutional vision (i.e. the Strategic Plan) and the 
workings of the higher education marketplace. Unlike Gardner’s assertion that a leader’s 





here were involved experts in the forces surrounding a decision to increase tuition. In turn, they 
would require a well-articulated and convincing story in order to be compelled to act in 
accordance with Dr. Cooper’s new and innovative narrative. 
 Therefore, Dr. Cooper proposed the exact findings of the Pricing Policy Task Force to the 
Planning and Priorities Committee so that they too could objectively assess the merits of each 
proposed tuition increase. At the same time, he put the most emphasis on the strong merits of the 
$7,000 course of action.310 In this setting, he chiefly employed a central route of persuasion, 
which would have been most effective since “the rational, argument-based type of attitude 
change…will occur only when an individual is both (1) motivated to engage in the necessary 
thinking and (2) capable of understanding the arguments.”311 Since, by virtue of the committee’s 
mission, the committee members had to actively engage in the discussion and evaluation process 
of Cooper’s proposal and they were extremely knowledgeable of the subject matter of the 
decision beforehand, Cooper’s approach had the most potential to be effectively persuasive 
towards this group. After two sessions of deliberation, one in the spring of 2004 and another 
early in the next fall of 2004, the P&P Committee voted and confirmed that the $7,000 special 
tuition increase was the best course of action. Between the two meetings, though, Dr. Cooper’s 
proposal was put forth to another essential group in the meantime, the Board of Trustees. 
3. Board of Trustees 
 In the summer months of 2004, Dr. Cooper focused his persuasive efforts on the Board of 
Trustees. At the University of Richmond, as well as with nearly every college or university in the 
nation, the Board’s primary responsibility is “to define the purpose and mission of the 





also the ultimate arbiter of decision-making at the University and Dr. Cooper had to take extreme 
care with all forty trustees to make sure that they bought into his new narrative for the University 
of Richmond’s identity. As a result, in the summer of 2004, he arranged luncheons with each and 
every trustee for the sole purpose of engaging in an in-depth discussion about the proposed 
tuition increase. He wanted to make certain, before disseminating news of the decision to the rest 
of the internal Richmond community, the faculty and administration, that he had the Board’s 
wholehearted support. However, as alluded to previously, the persuasion of the Board of 
Trustees did not just begin in the summer of 2004. According to Dr. Cooper, he enacted a “five-
year grooming process” of the Board of Trustees, dating back to the advent of the strategic 
planning process in 1999.313 This “grooming process” included successfully implementing the 
first smaller tuition increase, but also subtly communicating messages continually in trustee 
meetings, formally and informally, of the necessity for additional sources of revenue in the years 
leading up to the tuition increase.314  
 During these luncheons, Dr. Cooper put forth similar arguments to each trustee as he did 
to the Planning & Priorities Committee. He strategically explained the many merits of the special 
tuition increase of $7,000 and how such provided the necessary financial resources to become 
the “Swarthmore-plus” University, the ultimate long-term goal which the Board had charged him 
with at the beginning of his tenure.315 He explained the potential short-term difficulties, but how 
they would be offset due to the wide range of long-term benefits resulting from the potential 21.6 
million increase in annual revenues.316 The message differed slightly though, for Dr. Cooper 
employed both a central and a peripheral route of persuasion in speaking with the trustees. He 
employed the central route in the same manner as his communication with the P&P Committee. 





everyday University operations as the P&P Committee, he had to rely on the efforts and the 
expertise of the Pricing Policy Task Force to provide a heuristic cue to the Board that his 
decision was sound. Olson and Haynes assert that “the most important cue for peripheral 
persuasion is source credibility.317 Therefore, his well-informed arguments were backed by the 
fact that their source was from two very knowledgeable parties, both the Pricing Policy Task 
Force and Dr. Cooper himself. In addition, the venue in which Dr. Cooper communicated his 
messages, during surely expensive and delicious luncheons, probably also provided a subtle, 
peripheral cue of positivity which influenced each trustee to some degree.318 By summer’s end, 
Dr. Cooper had enough confidence that all forty trustees were on board with his new direction 
for the University, giving him the confidence to then communicate the proposal to the rest of the 
Richmond community.   
4. Faculty and Administration 
 At the beginning of the fall semester of the 2004-05 academic year, the Board of Trustees 
had been effectively convinced on the merits of Dr. Cooper’s special tuition increase and the 
P&P Committee had voted and confirmed the $7,000 special tuition increase to be passed along 
to the Board of Trustees for formal approval. The next step in the decision-making process was 
to formally present the proposal to faculty and administration at the University Faculty Meeting 
on September 15, 2004.319 Dr. Cooper had to recognize that these individuals were not 
necessarily directly involved in the decision-making process, yet he still needed their support 
before the proposal was put before the Board of Trustees that October. Again, the university 
faculty could be considered “sophisticated,” as experts of their domain, in the sense that they 
were very familiar with university operations and had much invested in their institution. But, at 





university identity as-it-was in years past. Therefore, Dr. Cooper had to convey his narrative of 
innovation in a way that accommodated the precise priorities of his faculty.  
 As described previously, Dr. Cooper used a central route of persuasion to a large degree. 
In this meeting, he explicitly put forth the findings of the Pricing Policy Task Force and solicited 
faculty input on the findings of the Task Force and the proposal to be considered by the Board of 
Trustees that October. The ensuing discussion mostly surrounded the University’s efforts to 
increase diversity in the student body and the potential negative, short-term consequences of the 
decision. Dr. Cooper conceded to the potential for higher tuition affecting middle-class families 
and admissions yield being adversely affected initially, but hammered home that the short-term 
negatives would be quelled by the long-term improvements in academic programs funded by the 
tuition increase.320 Dr. Cooper first put forth a comprehensive argument for the benefits of the 
tuition increase. He then solicited input from the faculty, allowing for potential “competing 
stories” and “counterstories” to emerge. When they did, he refuted their concerns with additional 
sound arguments. All of his arguments were backed with source credibility, namely the expertise 
of the Pricing Policy Task Force on the issue.  
 Moreover, most of this constituency lacked direct involvement in the decision throughout 
the entire process, and Dr. Cooper needed to generate a further sense of personal involvement in 
his narrative so that it was better internalized by his followers.321 One effective means of doing 
so is by explicating the various benefits specific to the followers themselves, i.e. what the 
follower stands to gain from the decision. One finds parallels to Cooper’s persuasive strategy 
here in social exchange theory which emphasizes the “implicit relational qualities of the 
transaction that exists between leader and followers, which yields effectiveness.”322 In short, 





tangible benefits.323 In turn, the followers provide a “heightened sense of responsiveness” to the 
leader and a “two-way relationship of influence” develops between leader and follower.324 
Therefore, in order for Dr. Cooper to attain legitimacy for his decision with this constituency, he 
had to elucidate the beneficial nature of the decision for the faculty and administrators. In this 
meeting, he did just that; he conveyed that more resources would be available for academic 
programs, class-sizes would shrink, faculty salaries would increase, etc.325 Since Dr. Cooper 
clearly communicated that the faculty and administrators stood to benefit from this decision, he 
augmented the group’s personal involvement in his decision, which aided in the effective 
internalization of his new narrative.  
 Additionally, a leader can provide his group with benefits besides those which are 
tangible and in their immediate self-interest. In fact, if a leader enacts a decision which may be at 
odds with the group members’ immediate interests and but in the best interest of the group in the 
long-run, a leader may need to craft his message in different manner in order to convey that fact. 
Michael A. Hogg’s social identity theory of leadership relates to Dr. Cooper’s leadership in this 
situation in that the theory “attributes a significant role in effective leadership to the perceptions 
and behaviors of group members as followers” and it “refers to a representation and evaluation 
of oneself in terms of shared attributes that define the group one belongs to, one’s “ingroup.”326 
The leader must manage the way in which they reflect the group identity, acting as a prototype of 
the group, in order to maintain their legitimacy with their followers. Once accomplished, the 
leader “can define what the group stands for and what the social identity of its members is, by 
consolidating an existing prototype, modifying it, or dramatically reconstructing it.”327 Dr. 
Cooper thus had to convey that he was strengthening the identity of his ingroup, especially in 





narrative to the faculty and administrators, he made such very clear, when he claimed that 
“tuition, as the largest source of the University’s income, unfairly limits our programs if it is 
priced too low in relation to other schools.”328 Through his decision to increase the University’s 
tuition, improvements to academic programs and academic quality would follow, bettering the 
institution as well as the “identities” of those closely associated with the University of 
Richmond, including the faculty and administration. What’s more, Dr. Cooper communicated 
that, upon the implementation of the tuition increase, the University of Richmond would begin to 
move ahead of its competitors in the higher education marketplace, and thus bettering the 
position of his ingroup in relation to the other relevant outgroups. Following the faculty meeting 
on September 15, 2004, the Board of Trustees voted on Dr. Cooper’s proposal for a special 
increase of $7,000 on October 15, 2004. It was subsequently approved for implementation for 
the 2005-06 academic year. After the formal approval, Dr. Cooper also reported that there was 
“no major pushback” from faculty or administration 
5. Public Information Campaign 
Up to this point, the four previous constituencies were very much involved in the overall 
decision-making process, had a firm knowledge of the forces surrounding the decision, and/or 
stood to clearly and directly benefit from the decision. However, such was not the case with all 
of the constituencies to which Dr. Cooper had to communicate his narrative of institutional 
innovation. After the decision was made, the University had to carry out a public information 
campaign in order to address and persuade those external to the decision-making process on the 
merits of the new direction which the University was taking towards the future. The public 
information campaign was relatively straightforward in outlining the University’s goals and the 





closer to the decision-making process. However, since the audience was relatively removed from 
the decision and everyday university operations, the message had to employ other persuasive 
tactics to be truly appropriate to each of its individual audiences. For the sake of this section, 
since the public information campaign was directed to all parties outside of the decision-making 
process, I will first describe the narrative of the campaign and then the priorities of each 
constituency and the campaign’s effectiveness. 
According to Dr. Cooper, the public information campaign’s chief focus was to 
emphasize the great potential for beneficial effects for the university’s long-term goals. Dr. 
Cooper modeled the public information campaign off those of other universities that had enacted 
similar tuition hikes in the past. The public information campaign was relatively short in nature, 
as were those of other schools, due to the inherent unpopularity of a large tuition increase. Dr. 
Cooper’s rationale for this was “no university I can think of ever announces a major tuition 
increase without push-back. The more you try to explain goals and benefits, the more you can 
anger those who do not share those goals, being more content with the status quo and ignoring 
issues of competitiveness.”329 Therefore, the public information campaign consisted of no more 
than several formal presentations and a few interviews with local news outlets. Various 
administrators and faculty were also briefed on key talking points in the event that they were 
questioned in public forums such as class, university events, fundraising trips, etc. in the months 
following the decision.330  
Dr. Cooper’s message in the public information campaign had several key portions. First, 
it generally reflected on all of the progress that the University had made since the approval of the 
2000 Strategic Plan. In broad strokes, he touched upon the momentum which the University had 





student fees. Dr. Cooper also consistently used a metaphor to describe the tuition increase, 
claiming that it was “fuel for the rocket” and would provide the essential financial resources to 
reach the University’s high aspirations. This metaphor was featured in most public reports on the 
University’s tuition hike. Metaphors are another one of Olson and Haynes’ message 
characteristics that increase persuasiveness. They claim that “metaphors generally increase the 
effectiveness of persuasive messages…thus increasing attention while also helping the recipient 
to organize and understand the arguments in a message.”331 The metaphor was also buttressed 
with linguistic cues such as the use of the words, “bold,” “ambitious” and “high aspirations,” 
which conveyed positive messages regarding the University’s great potential for the future. 
Finally, Dr. Cooper narrowed down the main benefits of the tuition increase to the achievement 
of two main institutional goals, future progress in academic quality and enhanced diversity in 
admissions by means of increased affordability.  
6. Students and Parents 
One of the most vital constituencies that had to be persuaded of Dr. Cooper’s decision 
was current and prospective students and their families (for simplicity’s sake, I will refer to this 
entire group as “students”). This group was not directly involved in the decision-making process 
and would be informed only after the decision was officially made. Not only that, but students 
would be most directly affected by the hike in tuition (except current students who would 
continue to pay the existing tuition rates). Additionally, most students are not generally well-
versed in the intricacies of higher education and the higher education marketplace. It is also not 
explicitly clear how students would directly or immediately benefit from an increase in tuition. 
From their perspective, they would now be paying more to attend an institution which offers the 





four percent. Even including the most affluent of students, no one generally is fond of paying a 
higher price for their already highly-priced college education. Taking all of the students’ 
priorities into consideration, Dr. Cooper would have to persuade a major constituency on the 
merits of what is, at first glance, an unpopular decision.  
 Dr. Cooper’s narrative to this group was received in several, mixed fashions. Some 
current students appreciated the fact that they were going to be associated in the future with a 
school poised to make such great progress, whereas other current students saw change as 
unnecessary with the potential to alienate middle-class students from attending the University.332 
Some prospective students too were dissuaded, or perhaps unaware of, Cooper’s story 
delineating the potential long-term benefits of the tuition increase and were compelled to attend 
other schools in the short-term, as seen by the decrease in applicants and the decrease in 
admissions yield in the short-time afterward.333 One can interpret these effects in a couple of 
ways. One could say that, since there was a downturn in prospective students in the years 
following the increase that Cooper did not effectually convey all of the potential benefits in the 
best way possible. On the other hand, one may claim that given the inherent unpopularity of the 
decision, Dr. Cooper did his best to mitigate the adverse short-term effects, as seen by the article 
in the Richmond Times-Dispatch which reads that the University was glad that applications only 
dropped by eight percent in the year following the tuition increase, considering they prepared for 
a decrease as high as 25 percent.334 There is validity in both trains of thought. One can always 
speculate about what else could have been done to have reversed unfavorable outcomes. 
However, I am inclined to agree more with the latter assessment, since Dr. Cooper was cognizant 
of and prepared for the short-term costs in light of the potential for larger long-term gains for his 






Another important and very vocal constituency, as in any university community, is the 
body of alumni. Many alumni very much identify with the university culture that was present 
when they attended the university in years past. Much care has to be taken to create buy-in with 
this group if a university president aims to innovate and change campus culture in any significant 
way. Alumni generally are very skeptical about major changes to the university which they knew 
and loved during their time spent there. Additionally, alumni are very influential in the university 
community and in everyday university operations, since they contribute to a significant portion 
of university finances via donations and gifts. A strong relationship with alumni is integral to a 
university president’s effectiveness. Furthermore, alumni too are not extremely familiar with the 
nuances of university operations. Therefore, a specific, inclusive type of message must be 
conveyed to this group, one which rallies the alumni around the new and innovative direction of 
the University. 
 Today there is a common sentiment amongst alumni that the University of Richmond is 
headed in a positive direction and they appreciate being associated with a university with ever-
increasing academic quality and standards, albeit one that charges a much higher tuition price 
than during their time.335 However, the sentiment among alumni at the time when Dr. Cooper 
made his decision varied. During Dr. Cooper’s tenure, alumni giving was decreasing and 
continued to do so in the years following the decision, partly because they were wary about the 
direction in which Richmond was heading.336 It can be stated that alumni could potentially have 
been more involved at the front-end of the decision-making process, or more attention could 
have paid in Dr. Cooper’s message in thoroughly conveying all of the benefits of the decision. 





definitely are inclined to present a strong “counterstory” of the value of past university culture in 
opposition to any major change proposed by a university president. In the short-term following 
his decision, perhaps Dr. Cooper could have addressed that constituency more. However, if 
given more time to see the benefits that stemmed from his decision actually come into fruition, 
he may have organically persuaded the alumni otherwise, in the same manner that he persuaded 
the Board of Trustees and other major university officials for his tuition increase: by displaying 
leadership competence, succeeding in attaining more university goals, and further embodying his 
new story of high ambition and achievement.  
D. Building and Managing an Organization which Supports Implementation 
In addition to developing a well-conceived and shared vision and persuasively 
communicating the vision in a manner appropriate to followers, the third and final element of 
Chandler and Chandler’s framework for leadership effectiveness to be discussed in this 
evaluation is “building and managing an organization that effectively supports the 
implementation of the vision” and “[ensuring] ongoing alignment between leader and 
followers.”337 In this section, I will discuss the manner in which Dr. Cooper managed the system 
of governance of the University of Richmond in order to implement his groundbreaking decision 
effectively. The entire institutional decision-making process initiated by Dr. Cooper’s proposal 
to raise the University’s tuition will be at the heart of this evaluation, for such is the most 
obvious domain in this study within which to effectively build, manage, and exercise his 
authority over his organization in accordance with his leadership narrative.  
Highly relevant to this evaluation are the findings of Tom R. Tyler and E. Allen Lind as 
presented in their article “A Relational Model of Authority in Groups.”338 In this article, they 





have…been linked to judgments about the fairness of the procedures used to make decisions. 
Procedural justice theories suggest that people focus on how decisions are made, as well as the 
decisions themselves…”339 They conclude that the legitimacy of a leader’s decision lies in 
“persons’ evaluations of the fairness of the procedures used by the authority in question,” more 
so than the outcome of the decision.340 One reason that they cite for “the preeminence of 
procedural justice” is that “in many social situations it is not at all clear what decision or action is 
correct in an objective sense.”341 The procedure, if sound, acts a cue or heuristic to followers that 
the decision will be sound since it is the product of a sound process. Therefore, effective 
leadership within an organization context may not always necessitate superlative outcomes, at 
least immediately, for the group or institution. Rather, effective leadership may also manifest 
itself through conducting a thorough and fair decision-making process and dealing accordingly 
with the generated outcomes. 
In order to gain initial legitimacy for his decision, Dr. Cooper first used the system of 
governance in the development of the 2000 Strategic Plan. In the strategic planning process, he 
involved all major tiers of the university hierarchy. He took into account the sentiments of the 
student body, faculty and administrators. He organized strategic evaluations of all facets of 
university operations and discerned necessary areas of improvements in all relevant parts of the 
campus community. Furthermore, best practice research was conducted on all competitor 
universities in order to discern how they were achieving their institutional goals better than the 
University of Richmond and to provide relevant benchmarks against which to measure the 
University’s successes.342 Dr. Cooper orchestrated a comprehensive strategic planning process 
that paid appropriate attention to all relevant parties within the University community. As a 





by his constituents, and thus he effectively developed a shared vision for his institution moving 
forward.  
In turn, Dr. Cooper gained a certain amount of legitimacy in proposing the means by 
which to achieve these institutional goals, since the process in developing the goals was 
generally agreed upon and perceived as fair. When the time came that Dr. Cooper felt he could 
feasibly propose a special tuition increase, he again utilized the University’s system of 
governance and formally submitted his proposal through the requisite university channels of 
decision-making. First, that involved the commission of the Pricing Policy Task Force, which, 
after carefully consulting with his Vice President of Finance, he charged to evaluate the merits of 
three potential courses of action. Instead of pigeon-holing the University into one specific course 
of action which he felt was best, considering no other options whatsoever, he aimed to grant his 
followers more autonomy in discovering the best possible route to take. After receiving the 
special report from the Pricing Policy Task Force, the proposal properly moved along to the 
Planning & Priorities Committee, which evaluated all three options, deliberated the pros and 
cons of each, voted and confirmed the $7,000 tuition increase. Afterwards, the P&P Committee’s 
confirmation was presented appropriately to faculty and administrators, and then rightly passed 
along to the Board of Trustees for formal approval. Again, the decision-making process was 
conducted in a thorough and fair manner, further gaining legitimacy for the decision itself. 
Though the specific outcomes were not entirely certain, the fairness of the process and the due 
diligence of each decision-making channel provided some heuristic cue to the University 
community that the decision was sound to some degree.343 Therefore, though some may disagree 
on the merits of the specific course of action that Dr. Cooper endorsed, one cannot deny the 





increasing the tuition at his institution. Also, by conducting these two major processes and 
managing his organization in a through and fair manner, he also by default ensured an “ongoing 
alignment between leader and followers”344  
E. Criteria for University Presidential Effectiveness  
On the whole, so far I have examined the decision that Dr. William Cooper made in 2004-05 
to increase the tuition of the University of Richmond by 31 percent and evaluated such by means 
of general leadership effectiveness.  I used three of the four elements of G. Donald Chandler and 
John W. Chandler’s framework for leadership effectiveness as my overall base-line for my 
appraisal. In my discussion of each specific element of Chandler and Chandler’s framework of 
leadership effectiveness, I have supplemented my appraisal with various other general theories of 
leadership, including Gardner’s leadership as story-telling theory, Hollander’s Idiosyncrasy 
Credit model, transactional leadership theory and social exchange theory, Morrill’s theory of 
strategic leadership in higher education, Olson and Haynes’s concept of the central and 
peripheral routes of persuasion and their characteristics of message persuasiveness, and Tyler 
and Lind’s theory on authority and procedural justice. Though I have applied these theories to 
Dr. Cooper’s actions within his university context, for the most part I have evaluated Dr. Cooper 
on general leadership effectiveness applicable to many contexts. 
Finally, I will briefly examine Dr. Cooper’s leadership by means of a theory which 
integrates leadership effectiveness and the contextual elements of higher education. Dr. Morrill, 
in his work Assessing Presidential Effectiveness, describes the ideal comprehensive assessment 
of a university president “which draws perspectives on the president’s effectiveness from 





specific criteria by which any university’s Board of Trustees ought to evaluate a university 
president when conducting a comprehensive assessment of the president’s effectiveness. These 
criteria reflect much of what has already been discussed in this section up to this point as well as 
including other university-specific considerations. The criteria are broad enough to be relevant to 
universities of all sizes, governance structures and financial backgrounds, but specific enough to 
draw out the most essential considerations of presidential leadership within the higher education 
landscape.346  The criteria are as follows: strategic leadership, educational leadership, 
organizational management, financial management, fundraising, external relations, internal 
relations, board and governance relations, personal characteristics and values, and broad 
questions of general achievement.347  
 Implicitly referring to aforementioned examples in this chapter, I assess Dr. Cooper 
broadly on these ten criteria. Dr. Cooper, through his strategic planning process, his decision-
making process in enacting and implementing the substantial increase in Richmond’s tuition, and 
the integration of a new narrative into the University of Richmond community, definitely scored 
highly on most of Dr. Morrill’s criteria for university presidential effectiveness. In the Strategic 
Leadership criterion, he certainly demonstrated an understanding of the culture, convincingly 
told its story and used a “credible and collaborative strategy process to renew the mission and 
create a compelling vision.”348 In Educational Leadership, he definitely assured “academic 
quality by mobilizing resources,” he did “encourage and enable educational…innovation” and he 
did actively participate in shared academic governance.349 Under the Organizational 
Management criterion, he definitely made “clear, timely and tough decisions.”350 In the realm of 
Financial Management, it can be said that he successfully “communicate(d) financial realities to 





equilibrium.351 He also excelled in Internal Relations, by developing a climate and programs that 
enhanced diversity, and in Board and Governance Relations, by building a strong relationship of 
open communication, developing a “working understanding of board/faculty/administration’s 
respective roles in decision-making,” and by focusing the trustees on “mission and vision, 
strategic thinking, (and) resource use and acquisition…”352  
 On the other hand, even in the criteria which he may have scored less highly in some 
respects, he scored well in others. For example, in the realm of Fundraising, though alumni 
giving dipped noticeably during his tenure, corporate gifts and donations were at an all-time high 
for the University of Richmond.353 In the External Relations criterion, one may claim that 
Cooper could have done more to enhance his “credibility and influence with external 
constituencies.354 However, regarding the decision to increase the University’s tuition and the 
ensuing public information campaign, he made a tough decision that automatically made external 
relations difficult and he then left the University of Richmond not long after. Conceivably, over 
time as the University continued to progress and increase its national reputation, Dr. Cooper may 
have taken additional steps to better his relationship with external parties. Plus, part of the 
External Relations criterion is increasing the visibility and reputation of the institution, to which 
Dr. Cooper did contribute in the years following the tuition increase. 
II. EXCEPTIONAL LEADERSHIP 
 On the whole, one can say that Dr. Cooper was effective as a leader throughout the 
specific decision-making process per Chandler and Chandler’s criteria of effective leadership. 
On certain occasions, ethics and effectiveness can be seen as entirely congruent. What is ethical 
in a situation is sheer effectiveness and the leader acted ethically because he brought about the 





Cooper, through his efforts worked to reshape and retell the story of the University of Richmond 
as one no longer of financial modesty, but one of reinvigorated academic ambition and long-term 
financial sustainability. He achieved such by successfully developing a well-conceived and 
shared vision for the University, by persuasively communicating his vision in a manner 
appropriate to his constituents (at least to those involved internally in the decision-making 
process in the short-term),  and finally by productively managing and organization that facilitated 
the implementation of the tuition increase.356 However, if a leader effectively achieves goals for 
one’s group or institution that do not actually better the group or institution, or the goals 
themselves are intrinsically immoral, then such is not an example of good leadership. That leader 
is merely effective, not exceptional. Presupposing Dr. Cooper’s general effectiveness as a 
university leader in this instance, considering the fact that he did successfully implement the 
tuition increase with enough support from his constituents, one needs to evaluate whether the 
good for the University community, good for the liberal arts and good for society as a whole. 
That is, was the decision exceptional leadership? 
A. Betterment of the University and its Constituents 
When looking at Dr. Cooper’s leadership from a teleological perspective of leadership 
ethics, “what really matters is that the leader’s actions result in bringing about something morally 
good or ‘the greatest good.’”357 The focus is placed upon the ends resulting from Dr. Cooper’s 
actions, and whether those results had any moral significance. While serving as President of the 
University of Richmond, Dr. Cooper sought to better the institution in numerous ways, and his 
means of doing so was through a glaringly large increase in undergraduate student fees. I will 
first examine if the tuition increase actually led to the institutional advancement which Dr. 





Initially, Dr. Cooper aimed to enhance the University’s position in the higher education 
marketplace as a result of the 31 percent increase in tuition. He took steps to expand the 
University’s annual tuition revenue in order to offer a better quality education for current and 
future students of the University. He forthrightly acknowledged growth opportunities for the 
institution and aspired to improve the University’s market position in relation to its competitor 
schools and national notoriety. He sought to provide more financial sustainability for his 
institution over the long-term. Equally important, he intended to increase access to and the 
overall affordability of a University of Richmond education in the long-term. All of these major 
goals were articulated before, during and after the decision to increase tuition. 
By bench-marking the economic position of the University of Richmond in 2004 against 
its relative place immediately following the decision and over a longer span of time leading up to 
the present, one can examine the progress of the institution and the degree of influence which Dr. 
Cooper’s decision had upon it. In 2004, when the University charged a sticker-price of $31,910, 
the University was ranked by US News and World Report as the top Southern Regional 
institution.358 The total expenditures per student and the student-faculty ratio, both correlated 
with academic quality, were $46,734 and 9.4:1 respectively. The endowment, though it had 
decreased slightly in years previous, was $1.1 billion. The number of applications received, a 
reflection of student demand, had reached an all-time high of 6,236. The acceptance rate in 
admissions had dipped to 39 percent and the admissions yield, the percentage of accepted 
students who attend the University, was 31 percent. $16.9 million was spent in total on need-
based financial aid awards and 12 percent of the University’s student population represented a 





demonstrated need had just been instituted, but its sustainability was called into question because 
of the slight volatility in endowment performance.359  
Afterwards, in the two academic years following the decision which also coincided with 
the conclusion of Dr. Cooper’s tenure as President, certain key indicators of institutional 
performance had worsened. By 2006-07, the number of applications decreased to 5,423 and the 
acceptance rate had increased to 46 percent. The quality of admitted student, as measured by 
SAT scores, decreased as well from 1294 in 2004 to 1259 in 2006.360 On the other hand, some 
key financial indicators, such as annual revenue and expenditures per students, remained 
relatively constant.361 The University had gained national notoriety, for it was now ranked in the 
National Liberal Arts category in US News and World Report.362 The University also increased 
need-based financial aid expenditures over those two years by roughly $4 million.363 Though 
such results were an expected short-term cost prior to the realization of the potentially beneficial 
long-term opportunities, Dr. Cooper left during this general downturn. Thus, while in a position 
of direct influence over the institution, the University was not necessarily in a wholly better 
position in the marketplace. 
On the other hand, even if Dr. Cooper was not in a position of direct authority over the 
entire implementation process of the tuition increase, one can still see how he could remain 
partially instrumental in the achievement of further institutional progress. As with governmental 
fiscal policy, the university policy to increase undergraduate student fees had an impact lag. An 
impact lag is the time between the implementation of a policy and the actual attainment of its full 
effects over time. As outlined in the report of the Pricing Policy Task Force, it would take a full 
four years for the University to receive the projected ultimate annual income of $20.6 million 





revenue. Remember, too, the third criteria of Chandler and Chandler’s framework for effective 
leadership: building an organizational construct that “institutionalizes the vision even after the 
leader is gone.”365 Dr. Cooper had a forward-looking vision of which the backbone was a 
significant increase in revenue; that revenue provided the organizational capacity to make 
enduring institutional change. He successfully implemented a change in policy that obtained the 
additional revenue that catalyzed further goal achievement by the institution. Whereas his time as 
President ended, his competitive tuition policy endured. Therefore, to some degree, one can 
surely attribute the effects of the tuition increase over a longer time span to Dr. Cooper’s 
leadership, even though he held no formal position or had no formal control over the direction of 
the University after the year 2007. 
Ten years after the decision, while now under the new leadership of Dr. Edward Ayers, 
the University of Richmond has made substantial gains in the higher education marketplace.  
Most important is the fact that the tuition subsidy the University of Richmond offers its students 
has increased considerably. The University of Richmond now spends on average $78,253 per 
student, while it charges $55,590 per student, leading to an average tuition subsidy for all 
students, pre-financial aid, of $22,390.366 In 2004, the average tuition subsidy was $18,010.367 In 
addition, today the school offers a total of $41.9 million in need-based financial aid to its 
students, the average need-based financial aid gift for qualifying students being $41,800.368 The 
average tuition subsidy and need-based financial subsidy have increased noticeably in the last ten 
years. In addition, in 2004-05, 28.1 percent of all aid received by Richmond students was in the 
form of loans, whereas the percentage decreased to 24.1 by 2013-14. Thus, of the total average 






As touched upon significantly in the previous section on the economics of higher 
education, Gordon Winston, in his article “Why Can’t A College Be More Like A Firm,” states 
that “a large subsidy means a better bargain for students -- they get more for their money: more 
and better facilities, more distinguished professors, more student services... subsidies influence 
student demand, applicants respond to a good deal. And larger subsidies go with higher 
demand.”369 A larger tuition subsidy for all students developed from the tuition increase and 
other valuable improvements to the University’s key indicators resulted. Student demand for the 
University of Richmond increased; 9,825 prospective students applied to the University in 2014 
and admissions selectivity decreased by 16 points since 2007 to 30.3 percent.370 The endowment 
has nearly doubled since 2004, reaching $2.02 Billion in 2014, and the University is now tied for 
#25 in US News and World Report National Liberal Arts category.371 Other indicators of 
academic quality, besides rankings and expenditure per student also reveal growth; the student-
faculty ratio is now 8.1:1 and the median 50% SAT score for incoming students is now 1300-
1440.372 Given that the quality of admitted student increased, one can conclude that the “peer 
effects” phenomenon at the University improved as well, strengthening the overall academic 
output, since “good fellow-students…will lead to a better education than poor fellow-
students.”373 Diversity has also improved markedly, since the “students of color” population 
(U.S. and International) increased to 31 percent in 2014.374 What’s more, on April 17th, 2013, I 
sat down with Dr. Ayers and he mentioned something to the effect of Dr. Cooper’s actions in 
2004-05 regarding the University’s annual tuition revenue helped him greatly in achieving the 
goals of his own strategic plan during his tenure.375 Though it is apparent that there are many 
other factors which contributed to the notable advancement of the University of Richmond over 





tuition increase which laid the financial foundation for great potential improvements to 
Richmond’s academics and campus life. In that sense, his actions did lead to a betterment of his 
institution over time.  
Furthermore, since the institution clearly has progressed to greater heights since 2004, 
one can claim that the University’s constituents were bettered too as a result. At the time of the 
decision, Richmond students were unaffected by the tuition increase, since it was grandfathered 
to first-year and transfer students. Prospective students, in the early years of the tuition increase, 
could be seen to have not benefited, for they were paying more for what was generally the same 
quality of education. However, one could also claim that Richmond was previously underpriced 
and those individuals were now paying the “going rate” for a school of that academic pedigree. 
Today’s admitted students certainly benefit since they now have the ability to attend a school 
which offers an enhanced quality of education. Alumni also benefit from future improvements to 
their university. They belong exclusively to their university network, a network which now 
includes even higher-achieving individuals, for the most part, than those who attended the school 
during their time. At the same time all parties, past and present, have/will have degrees that read 
“The University of Richmond.” Their social identities benefit as the value of a Richmond 
education is seen in an ever more positive light. Faculty, administrators and staff received 
tangible benefits in the form of higher salaries and greater institutional resources, and faculty 
even more so from smaller class sizes. Overall, many constituencies clearly were made better off 
in the long-run.  
The aforementioned parties are obvious beneficiaries in this situation. However, to make 
an over-arching statement that all parties clearly benefit from an overall betterment of the 





also University constituencies could have benefited for other reasons besides the tuition increase. 
A chief objective of the decision was to increase overall affordability, and in turn access to the 
University of Richmond and diversity in the student body. Though it is clear that diversity 
increased, the fact that the tuition increase was the root cause is not wholly clear. Also, even 
though Dr. Cooper’s decision increased annual tuition revenue along with need-based, financial 
aid expenditures, it is not immediately clear that access to the University of Richmond for all 
demographics increased beneficially. However, if we consider Pell Grant-recipient and middle 
class students specifically in this discussion we can see if access increased for certain. 
In order to examine possible non-effects or ill effects of the tuition increase, one may 
revisit a study by the New America Foundation that found “there is compelling evidence to 
suggest that many schools are…using Pell Grants to supplant institutional aid they would have 
provided to financially needy students…shifting these funds to help recruit wealthier students.376 
Fortunately, such was not the case with the University of Richmond following the decision. By 
2007, the “rate of Pell Grants awarded by the federal government to Richmond 
students…increased by 43.5 percent.”377 Better yet, by 2011, 18 percent of the Richmond student 
body consisted of Pell Grant recipients, with those students’ average net price being $7,150, 
making the University of Richmond a “best of the best” wealthy school by means of access and 
affordability.378 The University clearly used the additional revenue as it was intended, to increase 
access to the University of Richmond for lower-income students. Prospective lower-income 
students were better off since today they have an even better chance of being admitted to the 
University.  
Moreover, another concern of the decision to increase tuition was that middle-class 





would be inclined to admit more full-paying students in order to offset the increasingly larger 
admission of qualified, low-income students. That specific concern was not the case either. 
Anxiety exists that “need-blind” universities are not wholly helpful to needy students in 
awarding financial aid due to the practice of “gapping,” i.e. a “need-blind” institution telling an 
admitted student she needs $X to afford to enroll and then providing a package less than $X .379  
As a result, middle-class students who can pay some, but not all, of the sticker-price of a college 
education may receive insufficient aid from a “need-blind” school, practically barring them from 
enrollment. At the University of Richmond, though, the practice of “gapping” was eradicated 
when the University pledged a policy of meeting full, demonstrated aid. All students admitted to 
the University of Richmond, regardless of means, would receive financial aid truly according to 
their individual abilities-to-pay. Dr. Cooper’s decision was instrumental in sustaining 
Richmond’s generous financial aid policies in the long-run, thus middle-class students would not 
be adversely affected by the tuition increase. Therefore, in the years following Dr. Cooper’s 
decision, the two constituencies, prospective middle and lower-income students, whose potential 
benefits were in doubt, not only benefited from the general institutional progress over time, but 
stood to gain specifically from the positive effects of the tuition increase.  
B. Alignment with the Mission of a Liberal Arts Institution 
For the most part, Dr. Cooper can be seen to have been instrumental in the betterment of 
his institution. The intended ends from the tuition increase were achieved and those ends served 
to better the University of Richmond and its constituents.  One may now look at the ethics of Dr. 
Cooper’s leadership from a deontological or duty-based perspective, whether his actions were in 
line with that of the duties of a university president. Similar to the disparities between the 





entity, the duties of a university president differ from that of executives in other domains. A 
corporate executive’s duty generally is profit-maximization, whereas a university executive’s 
duty mainly lies in the educational quality of the university.  At the University of Richmond, the 
first broad duty of the President is to “partner with the Board of Trustees to preserve the mission 
of the University.”380  The mission statement of the University of Richmond reads:  
“The mission of the University of Richmond is to sustain a collaborative learning and 
research community that supports the personal development of its members and the creation 
of new knowledge. A Richmond education prepares students to live lives of purpose, 
thoughtful inquiry, and responsible leadership in a global and pluralistic society.”381 
Additionally, the second broad duty of the President is to “set a course for the future of 
Richmond as a leader in liberal arts education.”382  I will now examine whether Dr. Cooper’s 
decision aligned with both of his presidential duties. 
Initially, it can be said that Dr. Cooper demonstrably developed a working relationship 
with his Board of Trustees throughout the entirety of his tenure as President. As explained in 
chapter two, Dr. Cooper worked tirelessly over the first five to six years of his tenure in order to 
ensure that the collective vision of the trustees was in alignment with the vision that he had for 
the University of Richmond. At the beginning of his tenure, the Board of Trustees charged Dr. 
Cooper with certain aspirations for the University of Richmond, to formulate an institutional 
strategy to transform Richmond into a “Swarthmore-plus” university. Dr. Cooper internalized the 
Board’s challenge and developed a plan which involved a change in the school’s financial and 
academic cultures. In turn, Dr. Cooper realized that he needed to persuade the Board that his plan 





Strategic plan, he had to take deliberate steps to work directly and indirectly with the Board and 
demonstrate to them that he was working to better the institution. Directly, he individually 
lunched with every trustee, persuading them on the merits of the decision. Indirectly, by means 
of the smaller, initial special tuition increase, he showed that a tuition increase could truly lead to 
institutional progress in the realm of academics. Dr. Cooper certainly did not alienate himself 
from the Board of Trustees leading up to and throughout the decision-making process. Instead he 
fastened a firm partnership which facilitated an easy enactment of the tuition increase when the 
time came.     
But did Dr. Cooper’s partnership with the Board of Trustees preserve the mission of the 
University as stated above? The institutional vision for the University of Richmond per the 2000 
Strategic Plan seemed to align quite well with the mission of the University. In fact, the mission 
statement was one of the guiding principles of that strategic plan. If the mission statement reads 
that the University seeks to “sustain a collaborate learning…community” and to support the 
“personal development of its members” and to “create new knowledge,” then a strategic plan that 
focuses on enhancing the school’s academic programs, drawing the best quality people, faculty, 
students and staff alike, into those programs, and using those programs to better the people 
within the larger learning community at least seems to aim to preserve the mission statement. At 
the same time, preserving the mission of a University is an active endeavor. A strategic plan can 
be seen as the “intent” behind an institution’s actions, but a university must continually act and 
achieve further progress in order to preserve its mission. Since the institution did advance in 
academic quality during his tenure, and since the academic growth the University has 
experienced after his tenure can partially be attributed to his leadership, it can be said that Dr. 





Similarly, it has already been established that Dr. Cooper was instrumental in some 
degree in placing Richmond on the correct path, by means of the tuition increase amongst other 
things, to advance its position in the marketplace and become a better leader in the education 
industry. But, his second duty as President was to direct Richmond in offering a leading liberal 
arts education. We must examine then if Dr. Cooper’s actions advanced the Richmond education 
into becoming more in line with what a liberal arts education ought to resemble. One can look to 
scholarship on the ideals of a liberal education to clarify this point. Scholar Stephen J. Tonsor, in 
his article “Redefining Liberal Education,” claims that “the college community can never pursue 
the goals of liberal education effectively unless and until there is genuine debate and difference 
represented in the faculty and in the student body…Those who close off debate, who limit the 
views represented or discussed, whatever their motives, do a grave disservice to the educational 
process.”383 Tonsor speaks here about the value of a diversity of viewpoints in the classroom as 
being integral to a liberal education. In fact, he directly states that “community and 
diversity…are important elements in the achievement of an integral education.”384 One can see 
that Dr. Cooper aspired to fortify the Richmond liberal arts education through his intended ends 
of affordability, and in turn, access for students from different socioeconomic backgrounds. He 
knew that an eclectic range of perspectives would strengthen the education quality, not only in 
the classroom, but throughout the entire campus learning community, due to the prevalence of 
peer effects.  
In addition, Cardinal John Henry Newman, an important figure in the religious history of 
England and scholar on the liberal arts, wrote in his work, The Idea of a University, “The view 
taken of a University…is the following – That it is a place of teaching universal knowledge. This 





and extension of knowledge…”385 Cardinal Newman conveys that the purpose of a university 
was more intellectual and pedagogical, than moral or religious. Also, he asserts that research, the 
discovery of new knowledge, ought to take a lesser role than the teaching and the dissemination 
of knowledge to a university’s students. This point is furthered by his statement that "an 
academical system without the personal influence of teachers upon pupils, is an arctic winter; it 
will create an ice-bound, petrified, cast-iron University, and nothing else.”386 Not only should a 
liberal arts university focus primarily on teaching than on other functions, but the teachers 
themselves ought to be teaching and forming a “personal influence” upon students. Finally, 
Cardinal Newman too alludes to the powerful notion of peer effects in a liberal arts education. 
First, he supposes that “the primâ-facie view which the public at large would take of a University 
is nothing more or less than a place for acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great many 
subjects.”387 He also asserts, “Though they cannot pursue every subject which is open to them, 
they will be gainers by living among those and under those who represent the whole circle.”388 
Cardinal Newman holds that a university ought to offer a range of academic disciplines for its 
students. Plus, he says that though a student cannot feasibly study all of those subjects, being in 
the presence of other students who engross themselves in other particular subjects enhances their 
the learning of all As a result, students then learn to seek assistance from others, advancing 
ultimately the overall level of academic learning within the University. 
 Dr. Cooper seemed to have realized Newman’s ideals for liberal education when striving 
to attain the benefits for overall educational quality from a tuition increase. Newman asserted the 
primacy of teaching and importance of teachers’ personal impact on students. Dr. Cooper saw 
the tuition increase as a means to hire more faculty and better faculty, so as to increase teaching 





lesser teaching loads in order to balance better teaching with independent research. Newman also 
asserts that a liberal arts university should offer many classes in many disciplines, the byproduct 
being a well-rounded liberal education fortified not just by the personal influence of faculty, but 
also through peer effects. Cooper put emphasis in the strategic plan on people and programs. He 
sought to enhance the present academic offerings and develop even more interdisciplinary 
programming across the many facets of the university, diversifying the University’s academic 
product.389 Furthermore, once the university invested in improving its academic offerings, then 
its reputation would grow, attracting better students who will then better teach and learn from 
their own fellow students in the university’s academic climate. By bolstering each individual 
entity of people and programming, through the revenue from the tuition increase, Dr. Cooper 
intensified the positive interplay between the two, thus elevating the positive realities of the 
University of Richmond into further alignment with Cardinal Newman’s normative ideals of a 
liberal arts education.  
C. Betterment of Society 
Finally, we can begin to evaluate Dr. Cooper’s leadership on an even broader scale in 
order to determine if his actions led to a general betterment of society. The initial question of this 
case study proposed in Chapter One was to uncover the great disparity between the public 
viewpoint of price increases in higher education and colleges’ propensity to increase their prices 
continually. So far, given the unique workings of the economics of higher education, the major 
justification behind tuition increases has been established. Essentially, with more revenue and 
wealth, universities can offer better educational quality, leading to an overall betterment of the 
institution. However, the question of whether a large tuition increase like the University of 





When examining the ramifications of continual price increases in the higher education 
marketplace, one can look to Gordon Winston’s idea of the competitive arms race in higher 
education. Winston claims, “In an arms race, there is a lot of action, a lot of spending, a lot of 
worry, but if it’s a successful arms race, nothing much changes. The essence of an arms race is 
position — how a country or university stands relative to others.”390 Winston asserts that in the 
higher education marketplace, a university’s access to student quality “depends on its position 
relative to other institutions…[and] in turn, on the size of its student subsidy…relative to that of 
other colleges and universities.391 Due to the fierce competition in the market place and the 
scarcity of top student quality, universities are pressured to spend money to increase their 
relative position since other universities are doing the same. Curtailing expenditures would leave 
a university vulnerable to a decrease in ranking. As a result, prices escalate quickly, whereas the 
academic quality of institutions may not be increasing at the same rate.  
Additionally, another potentially troubling aspect of the competitive arms race in higher 
education is the nature of the expenditures implemented by colleges and universities. In their 
work, “The Economics of Cost, Price and Quality in U.S. Higher Education,” Michael 
McPherson and Gordon Winston touch upon the “cost-quality” quandary in higher education, 
“the problem that at elite private colleges and (some) universities, where the intensity of 
commitment to high quality in undergraduates teaching has traditionally been highest, costs to 
the buyer seem to be going through the roof.”392 They claim that an additional problem is that 
“student demands matter too much” at private colleges and universities.393 In essence, for top 
private institutions to differentiate themselves in the marketplace, those schools spend money on 
items that are not “genuinely educationally valuable [and] such frills add to the cost of education 





improve educational quality, schools spend money instead on lavish dormitories, numerous 
dining facilities and climbing walls, amongst many other things. According to McPherson and 
Winston, catering to “student demands” in this fashion only exacerbates the spiraling price 
increases in the marketplace.  
It is clear that one of Dr. Cooper’s motives behind the tuition increase was to increase the 
institution’s competitive position. Dr. Cooper was playing directly into the “arms race” prevalent 
in the marketplace. In fact, Dr. Cooper chose to increase the sticker-price of the University’s 
tuition by an amount far more than his competitors at that point in time. One could feasibly 
criticize Dr. Cooper then for not disrupting the marketplace and pandering to the potentially 
troubling market trends. At the same time, the revenue generated from the tuition increase, the 
projected $21.6 million in annual revenue, was earmarked specifically for improvements to 
educational quality and solidifying the University’s generous need-based financial aid policies. 
Dr. Cooper did not intend to spend the money superfluously on “frills” which provided no 
“comparable benefits” for education; he intended to differentiate his University from its 
competitors by aligning with them in price and subsequently surpassing them in academics. 
Furthermore, if one were claim that Dr. Cooper ought to have bucked the common trend of price 
increases and rapid expenditures in the marketplace, then he could potentially have acted 
contrary to his duties as the President of the University. It has been established already that the 
decision to increase tuition was in line with the University’s mission and the mission of a liberal 
arts institution. Perhaps if Dr. Cooper did not increase the price of tuition to a competitive level, 
then it could be said that he did not do enough to achieve the institution’s vision of becoming the 





Moreover, reflecting on the previous discussion on the mission of a liberal arts university, 
many make the case that a liberal arts education is good for society and its members. From an 
economic perspective, 80 percent of employers agree that, regardless of their major, all college 
students should acquire broad knowledge in the liberal arts and sciences.395 The majority of 
employers agree that having both field-specific knowledge and skills and a broad range of skills 
and knowledge is most important	  long-term career success.396 From a societal perspective, 
McPherson and Schapiro argue that, in the ever-evolving technological landscape of the future, 
“these trends are likely to increase society's need for liberal and general education.”397 A wide-
ranging liberal arts education provides society with individuals who possess enough knowledge 
and adaptability to thrive in ever-changing contexts, whereas more technical forms of education 
may suffer from the same obsolescence as technology itself.398 From a citizenship perspective, 
the overarching goal of a liberal arts education is to provide students with the necessary skills to 
construct lives of substance and achievement, helping them to become wise citizens.399 Also, 
Martha Nussbaum, a professor of law and ethics at the University of Chicago, argues that a 
liberal education provides “a cultivation of the whole human being for the functions of 
citizenship and life generally.”400 A quality liberal arts education has great utility for society and 
its members, especially in equipping citizens with wide-ranging knowledge, preparing them for a 
life of great contributions to others.  
Taking all of this into consideration, one can argue then that if Dr. Cooper worked to 
better the value of the University of Richmond liberal arts education, then he, to some degree, 
bettered society as a whole. Ultimately, though, Dr. Cooper helped to improve society mostly 
because his actions led to the betterment of the University. The University of Richmond was on 





students, regardless of financial background, by means of overall affordability. All of society 
benefits when more people have college educations.401 Following the tuition increase, though the 
University of Richmond was not offering a greater number of degrees per se, it was striving to 
offer a better degree to a wider spectrum of individuals. It can be said that there were some 
“losers” as a result of the decision, the full-paying students who now have to pay more than 
before for a Richmond education, the Universities who subsequently lost students to the 
University of Richmond, and the individuals who were fond of Richmond’s culture before the 
tenure of Dr. Cooper. However, it is not as though Richmond’s future success came at the 
precise detriment of other parties. It can also be said that Dr. Cooper played into the competitive 
arms race in higher education, when he could have acted otherwise in lieu of enacting a major 
tuition increase. However, it can equally be argued that the school truly was underpriced at the 
expense of the school’s constituencies, and following the increase in tuition the University was 
working to realize its full potential in the higher education marketplace, just as it was working to 
realize the full potential of its students. All in all, there were no seriously evident negative ethical 
implications for society resulting from Dr. Cooper’s decision to increase the tuition of the 
University of Richmond by 31 percent. Truthfully, society benefited from the University of 
Richmond using its additional revenue to enhance its liberal education, to expand its potential 
reach to students from all backgrounds, and to provide society with more knowledgeable and 
socially aware citizens. Since Dr. Cooper’s exhibition of leadership passes this ethical appraisal, 
one can also claim that it was an example of exceptional leadership as well.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, at the beginning of this case study of Dr. Cooper’s leadership, there were 





of Richmond by 31 percent. The first question that was posed asked why someone would 
increase a University’s tuition by such a large amount, in light of all of the societal scrutiny 
around the rapid price increases in higher education. The short answer lies in the hierarchy of 
wealth within economic marketplace of higher education. The market is a “winner-takes-all” 
model, where the wealthiest private schools are the schools which charge the highest sticker-
prices, but at the same time can spend the most per student and offer the greatest tuition subsidies 
to their students. Simply put, these universities spend substantially more per student than they 
charge each student. The tuition subsidies signal to students the high quality of the school’s 
education, thus these schools draw the top quality students to their institutions. Due to the 
presence of peer effects, the best students also teach and learn from other great students, 
furthering the quality of education at these institutions. Similarly, these top schools typically 
offer the most generous, need-based financial aid policies and are considered most affordable, 
since they offer the greatest access for qualified students from all demographics. The higher 
education marketplace is very distinct from the traditional microeconomic marketplace, hence a 
tuition increase can actually make a university more affordable for more people. Therefore, Dr. 
Cooper’s rationale for the major tuition hike in 2004-05 was that the university was underpriced 
in the marketplace and the tuition increase would increase the university’s overall wealth, 
leading to advancements in educational quality and affordability.  
The second question proposed during this case study asked how Dr. Cooper actually 
made and implemented the decision to increase the tuition by 31 percent. First, at the onset of his 
tenure at the University of Richmond, Dr. Cooper recognized the great disparity between the 
University’s aspirations and the University’s financial position. Given the University’s enduring 





the case for a tuition increase to key constituencies in the five years between the approval of the 
2000 Strategic Plan and the decision in 2004-05. He revealed that a small special tuition increase 
could result in substantial goal achievement in 2001-02. He groomed the Board of Trustees over 
time, even lunching with them personally in the summer of 2004, convincing them of the merits 
of a tuition increase. Finally, after the commission of the Pricing Policy Task Force, he proposed 
the three potential increases of $3,000, $5,000 and $7,000 to the Planning and Priorities 
Committee. The $7,000 option was approved and forwarded to the Board of Trustees, where it 
was formally approved for implementation for the 2005-06 academic year. He successfully made 
this ground-breaking decision with clear foresight and many deliberate and strategic leadership 
steps over a five to six year period. 
The final and most important question presented in this study was whether Dr. Cooper’s 
decision was an instance of good leadership, in the realms of both effectiveness and ethics. Dr. 
Cooper certainly exhibited “effective leadership” overall. He developed a well-conceived and 
shared vision for the University through the development of the 2000 Strategic Plan and by 
retelling the story of the Richmond’s identity, all grounded in firm knowledge of the economics 
of higher education. For the most part, he persuasively communicated the vision in a manner 
appropriate to the constituencies of the University of Richmond. One shortcoming of his overall 
effectiveness though occurred in communicating the decision to parties external to the decision-
making process. Dr. Cooper also built and managed an organizational framework which 
implemented his vision over time. Through the additional revenue garnered from the tuition 
increase, the University was able to make great progress in educational quality and overall 
affordability even after Dr. Cooper had departed the Presidency at the University. Furthermore, it 





While not evident in the short-term, his decision did contribute to an overall betterment of the 
institution over time. Additionally, his decision did align with the normative ideal of the liberal 
arts for the University progressed to become a leading liberal arts institution. Finally, though 
some may claim that Dr. Cooper’s decision played into the troubling competitive arms race in 
higher education, the expenditures resulting from the tuition increase were not earmarked for 
superfluous endeavors, but rather for justifiable goals of enhanced academic quality and 
institutional affordability. Therefore, by being instrumental in his institution offering a better 
liberal education, one can say that Dr. Cooper bettered society as a whole, which, in turn, permits 
us to say that his decision was an exhibition of exceptional leadership. All in all, Dr. Cooper’s 
decision to increase the tuition of the University of Richmond by 31 percent was an exhibition of 
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